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I. INTRODUCTION

During the twentieth century, the income tax evolved as the
principal source of revenue for the federal government. 1 In the
early 1970s, however, academic writers began to reexamine the
desirability of an income tax. 2 More recently, the income tax has
come under attack from legislators3 and commentators,4 who have
proposed alternative tax systems. As a result, it appears that
fundamental tax reform is more likely now than at any other time
in the history of the modern income tax.
This article discusses the movement toward an economy in
which virtually all transactions of significant size are done
electro~cally, either through credit cards; electronic bank
transfers, or electronic commerce ("e-commerce").
Indeed,
observation of our current economy reveals that the economy is
close to that point already, 5 with paper currency relegated only to
minor transactions or illegal commerce. This movement, brought
about through technological change in electronic funds transfers

See, e.g. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POUClES 7-9 (Michael J. Graetz
& Deborah H. Schenk, eds., 3d Ed. 1995).
• See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
• See, e.g. Senator Pete V. Domenici, The Unamerican Spirit ofthe Federal Income Tax,
31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.273 (1994); Congressman Bill Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax
ReforminFRONTIERSOFTAXREFORM(MichaelJ. Boskin,ed.1996); H.R. 2060, 104thCong.,
1'' Sess. (1995) (Flat tax proposal introduced by Representative Anney and Senator Shelby);
S. 722, 1041h Cong., 1" Sess. (1995) (Direct consumption USA tax proposal by Senators
Nunn, Domenici, & Kerrey). See also infra, notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
• See RoBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX, (2"" Ed. 1995); MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ, THE DECUNE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997); FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM
(MichaelJ. Boskin ed. 1996); JOELSLEMROD&JONBAKIJA, TAXINGOURSELVES:ACITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM (1998); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S.
INCOME TAX (1999).
0
See, e.g. EUNOR HARRIS SOLOMON, VIRTUAL MONEY 6-7 (1997) (Describing the
movement away from paper currency toward electronic money transfers and other credit
transactions); Shahriar Tavakol, Digital Value Units, Electronic Commerce and
International Trade: An Obituary for State Sovereignty Over National Markets, 17 J.
MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 1197, 1197 (1999) (describing the evolution of banking
from paper currency to "e-commerce"); Heather C. Alston, Will that be Cash, Credit, or Emoney? 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 225, 225 (1997) (describing the replacement of paper
currency with credit cards and "e-money"); Thomas P. Vartanian, Doing Business on the
Internet: The Law of Electronic Commerce, 452 PLIIPAT 141, 146 (1996) ("the business of
fmancial intermediation may be heading for the most comprehensive overhaul of products
and delivery systems this century").
1
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and credit card transactions, has made point-of-sale taxation
feasible and inexpensive. As a result, this article recommends that
the income tax should be replaced by a system of taxation that
imposes and assesses the tax on transactions at the point-of-sale.
A point-of-sale system of taxation is most efficiently implemented
as a credit-type value-added tax ("VAT"), and this article
recommends the credit-type VAT as the primary model that should
be adopted in the future to take full advantage of the new
technology. Optimally, this model should replace the current
income tax in its entirety because it can raise the revenues now
being collected under the income tax less expensively. A retail
sales tax could also be implemented in the manner suggested in
this article.
·
Part II of this article examines the movement towards a
currency-free economy. Part III reviews the theoretical concepts
of tax incidence, discussing both the difference between legal and
economic incidence, and efficient taxation in order to explain the
difficulty of determining who actually bears the burden of taxes
and which taxes are economically most efficient. Thereafter, Part
IV analyzes the current personal income tax system using the
economics principles developed in Part II.· Part V examines the
dead-weight loss that results from the current personal income tax
system. Part VI discusses alternative tax systems as possible
replacements for the personal income tax and, in particular,
reviews several consumption tax reform proposals based on the
economics principles developed in Part III. The review in Part VI
is intended to explain the difficulty of comparing burden-sharing
among competing tax systems and of comparing their relative
efficiency.
Part VII recognizes the impact of technological developments
in electronic commerce on the government's ability to assess and
collect taxes effectively and efficiently at the point-of-sale and with
minimal dead weight loss and proposes a point-of-sale tax system
in the form of a value added tax with mechanisms for the
automatic and electronic collection of the tax. The proposed
system is explained and evaluated, particularly in light of the
criteria normally used by advocates of the income tax, especially
progressivity.

HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 4 2000-2001

2000]

The Transition to a Currency-Free Economy

5

II. THE MOVEMENT TO A CURRENCY-FREE ECONO~
Major financial transactions have been accomplished
electronically for several years. 7 Today, electronic consumer
transactions eclipse cash transactions in sheer dollar value,
although cash payments still constitute the vast majority of
transactions. 8 Consumer transactions extend from department
store transactions, which have used credit cards for many years,
to grocery store transactions, and most recently, purchases of
gasoline and toll road collections. For many middle-class
individuals, cash transactions have become the exception rather
than the norm. 9 For many, cash is only used for small incidental
purchases. 10
Electronic funds transfers ("EFTs") among financial
institutions have a long history, dating back to the 1950s and
1960s, and are now increasingly replacing paper checks. 11 Large
electronic funds transfers to individuals through direct deposit are
now quite commonplace. For example, for several years,
employees of even moderate size companies, as a rule have been
receiving salary payments through direct deposit. 12 More recently,
the government has been dispersing transfer payments
electronically as well. For example, Social Security retirement
payments are no longer made by check but rather are

• See John D. Muller,Selected Developments in the Law ofCyberspace Payments, 54 Bus.
LAw. 403 (1999) for a discussion of recent developments in e-commerce and electronic fund
transfers, some of which is summarized in this part. See also Vartanian, supra note 5, at
145-48.
• The history of this movement from cash to electronic payment is chronicled in
SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 26-32, 41-42.
• See id. at 39-40.
• See, e.g. Randall W. Sifers, Regulating Electronic Money in Small-value Payment
Systems: Telecommunications Law as a Regulatory Model, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 701, 703
(noting that most cash expenditures are now primarily made for "small-value cash
transactions").
•• See id.
" See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 26.
12
See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 705 (noting the use of electronic payment systems
has been at first exclusively the domain of larger institutions; however with advanced
technology, even small businesses can afford to utilize such payment systems).
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accomplished by crediting recipients' accounts directly. 13 Welfare
payments and food stamps are also dispersed through electronic
benefits transfers ("EBTs") directly onto "smart" cards. 14 It follows
that payments from these accounts will also be largely electronic. 15
Even electronic income tax refunds, at the urging of the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service"), are becoming more commonplace. 16
Consumer credit and debit card transactions have evolved
more recently than electronic funds transfers, beginning originally
as a "retail" phenomenon. 17 Under a credit card arrangement, the
bank member of the credit card system that issues the card agrees
to provide a line of credit to the cardholder. 18 This line of credit
can be used at any member retail establishment. 19 When the card
is used to make a retail purchase, the merchant submits,
electronically, the charge draft to the merchant's bank, which is a
member bank agent, and receives the amount of the draft less a
merchant discount (generally based on a percentage of the gross
amount of the draft) to compensate the merchant's bank. 2° For
example, if the customer charge is $100, the merchant may receive
$98 from its bank. 21 The merchant's bank, in turn, submits the
charge draft to the cardholder's card-issuing bank and receives the
amount of the draft less a fee or discount of perhaps $1. 22 The
cardholder's bank then bills the cardholder for the full amount of
the draft. Thus, on a $100 charge, which is ultimately paid in full
by the cardholder, the merchant may receive $98; the merchant's
bank may receive $99 but pay out $98 to the merchant, retaining
$1, and the cardholder's bank may receive $100, paying out $99 to

••
See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77WASH. U.L.Q. 461,469 (1999) (discussing electronic government benefits,
including social security and welfare).
" See id. See also SOWMON, supra note 5, at 79-82.
10
See SOWMON, supra note 5, at 81 (purchases with a smart card resulting in a credit
to the vendor's account).
10
See for example I.R.S. Tax Form 1040EZ.
17
See SOWMON, supra note 5, at 30-31.
10
See id. at 54.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See id. at 56.
22
Id.
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the merchant's bank and retaining $1. 23 Moreover, if the
cardholder does not pay the bill timely, interest accrues on the
outstanding balance. 24
Debit cards, or automated teller machine ("ATM") cards, in
contrast, are grounded in cash rather than credit transactions. 25
The cardholder who uses a debit card at a merchant's ATM sends
an electronic instruction to her bank for the desired cash "by
punching the proper commands into the ATM."26 The electronic
message is sent from the ATM to a central_ processing unit
("CPU"), i.e., a computer that virtually simultaneously (1) sends
the electronic message to the customer's bank, which withdraws
the appropriate amount from the customer's account and notifies
the CPU; (2) receives the notification from the customer's bank;
and (3) sends confirmation to the ATM, instructing it to provide
the required cash. 27 For these services, a customer generally does
not pay a fee if the customer's bank owns the ATM, although a
charge is levied if the ATM owner is a different bank. 28
Importantly, credit card and debit card transactions share a
common attribute -both are supported by "real" money; the debit
card immediately when the amount is deducted from the
cardholder's bank account, and the credit card when the charge is
paid by the cardholder. 29 Thus, both transactions travel through
a financial institution and are accounted for by the actual
movement of bank deposits, backed by reserves. Therefore, the
Federal Reserve, as central banker, exercises control over both
types of transactions.
Recently, there has been significant growth in internet
commerce and a great deal of increased interest in the use of
electronic money ("e-money") in internet transactions. 30 In
contrast to credit or debit cards, true "e-money" can be created by
a private entity, which can be used to purchase goods and services

See id. at 55-57.
.. See id. at 56.
26
See id. at 57, 135.
28
ld. at 135.
21
See id. at 135-37.
28
See id. at 137-38.
28
See id. at 49.
30
See id. at 64.
28
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in a network established or controlled by that entity. 31 In essence,
"e-money" is a simple IOU that may not be backed by any
reserves. 32 The "e-money" can function as a medium of exchange
if it becomes generally accepted by people or companies that
engage in commerce over the network. Even if"e-money" becomes
accepted, it may never be reflected in any real money account at a
financial institution and therefore, under current law, remains
outside of the control of the Federal Reserve. 33 Even though both
occur electronically, tracing "e-money" is problematic because it is
more difficult than tracing official bank money. 34 Nevertheless,
as the Internet develops and expands and becomes an increasingly
important avenue of commerce, "e-money" is likely to develop and
expand as well.
At the present time, the most common means of payment for
consumer transactions remains the paper check,35 although this
may be more a result of circumstance than studied preference.
Moreover, often the payment of consumer credit card bills is
accomplished using paper checks. Thus, the actual purchase ·
transaction is made by credit card and not by check. Although
consumers can avoid using paper checks by banking electronically,
banks often make paYm.ents to the recipient by paper check. 36
Currently, on-line bill presentment and payment is used only by
a few major billers such as utilities, cable companies, and credit
card companies. 37 However, it is not difficult to foresee ordinary
financial transactions by financial institutions and consumers
conducted entirely by electronic means.
Cash transactions are popular for small transactions and
where privacy is desired. 38 To deal with the fact that credit card
transaction costs are significant and uneconomic for small

See id. at 65-66.
See id. at 75-78.
10
See id. at 66-68, 75-78.
14
Id.
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 408.
'" Note, however, that the bank may also make the payment electronically, if provided
with sufficient banking information about the recipient. See id. at 408-09.
11
See id. at 410.
18
See SWIRE, supra note 13, at 464 ("Nothing in the exchange of cash leaves any record
linking the purchaser to the purchase").
11

12
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purchases,39 Stored Value Cards have been developed. 4° Current
"e-money" technology is capable of delivering products with
varying degrees of privacy. For example, it is technologically
possible to provide fully anonymous, cash-like systems, in which
no personally identifiable transaction records are created. 41 On
the other end of the spectrum, it is also technologically possible to
provide fully auditable systems that can identify and store every
transaction conducted by every consumer. 42 Thus, the choice of
which avenue to pursue or what mix to settle upon is less likely to
be determined by the technological possibility of the choice than by
consumers' desire for privacy in their electronic transactions.
Technology makes it possible for the federal government
taxing authorities to follow all commercial electronic transactions,
if a fully auditable system were desired. A "blinding" technique,
patented by encryption expert and mathematician Dr. David
Chaum, can even preserve the anonymity of the user of a Stored
Value Card. 43 Under this technique, the bank is able to verify the
electronic transfer without learning the identity of the payor. 44
Likewise, the technique prevents the payee from learning the
identity of the payer. 45 Further, if the Stored Value Card contains
any unused value, it can only be redeemed by transferring that
value back to the account from which it originated. 46 A fully

.. See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 411 .
.., See id. at 68-71.
41
See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 724 ("Anonymity -the key feature of cash in the eyes
of illicit transactors - can be preserved with smart cards, unlike other forms of verifmble
electronic payment mechanisms such as debit cards and credit cards. For example, the use
of an anonymous smart card is not identified at the point-of-sale when the card value is
discharged. The recipient merely obtains value from the issuer which is eventually cleared
through a clearing system, without the user being identified").
42
See id. at 723 ("Electronic payment systems are capable of establishing electronic audit
trails with all of the features of non-electronic information").
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 432. See also SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 63 (detailing Dr.
Chaum's other contributions to "e-money").
" See, e.g. supra note 41.
.. See Muller, supra note 6, at 432.
'" See, e.g. SIFERS, supra note 9, at 714 (noting that electronic money may be created with
a feature which would require "links to the current owner" such that once a smart card is
used to make a payment, any refund of that payment would necessarily go back to the
original purchaser's card).
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auditable system could eliminate the potential of an electronic
black market. 47
. Based on a study sanctioned in October 1996 by Chairman
Alan Greenspan, 48 the Federal Reserve has noted that the new
payment methods have failed to duplicate the convenience and the
widespread acceptance of the current paper-based check system for
most consumers and businesses' everyday transactions. The
Federal Reserve, however, is seeking to encourage and facilitate
new electronic retail payment methods. 49
This section described how non-cash commerce takes place and
highlighted some of the developments that have made electronic
transfers more adaptable to consumer use. The review of these
techniques and the literature written about them clearly indicates
that electronic transfers are receiving much thought in both the
private and government sectors. 50 With the current technological
developments, a largely currency-free economy is likely to occur in
the near future. The substitution of electronic transfers for
currency is likely to accelerate as counterfeiting of paper currency
becomes easier due to these same technological developments. 51
Such acceleration would be consistent with the transformations
that have taken place in the brokerage industry (computerized
portfolio accounts ·have largely replaced share certificates), the
mutual fund industry (all accounts are reflected in computerized
statements updated to current net asset value virtually daily), and
the airline industry (ticket-less travel), among others. Whether
these changes are good or bad is immaterial to this paper. What
is important is that the movement toward electronic transfers as
the principal (and perhaps some day as the only) form of payment
in commerce appears inevitable.

See id. at 723 - 724(describing potentially improper uses of electronic money and how
they may be prevented through tracing).
.. See MULLER, supra note 6, at 430-31.
.. Id.
00
See generally SOLOMON, supra note 5 (discussing the various endeavors in electronic
transfers).
61
Other technological developments in the Internet will admittedly create security
concerns regarding conducting transactions electronically.
41
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ECONOMIC THEORY OF TAX INCIDENCE AND EFFICIENT
TAXATION

A

Tax Incidence

Choosing a tax system is the art of burden sharing. While the
choice of a burden-sharing system establishes the legal or
statutory incidence of the tax, it does not determine who actually
bears the economic burden or economic incidence of the tax. 52
Deterrilining who bears the economic incidence requires
substantially more analysis of the tax effect on the goods and labor
markets. 53
1. Economic Incidence of a· Tax, in General

Determining the economic incidence of a tax is complicated,
yet important because it is situated at the heart of the political
debate of who should bear the burden of taxes and whether that
burden is distributed fairly. If one were to conduct a survey, one
would suspect that most taxpayers would say they bear a
disproportionately large burden of the tax. However, even if the
survey respondents were completely aware of the legal incidence
of the tax, i.e., who bears the legal responsibility for and actually
pays the tax, it is unlikely that they would know who bears the
actual burden of the tax, i.e., the economic incidence of the tax.
A simple example will illustrate this point. If the federal
government were to decide to impose a $0.60 tax on a gallon of
gasoline, it could do so in two ways. 54 First, the federal
government could impose that tax on the gasoline seller, so that for
each gallon of gasoline sold the seller is liable for the $0.60 tax. 55
One would conclude, at least upon casual observation, that the

•• See generally HALR. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (4th ed. 1996); ANDREW
B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS (3d ed. 1998); and HARVEY S. RoSEN,
PuBLIC FINANCE (5th ed. 1999).

.. Id.
.. See VARIAN, supra- note 52, at 289-91; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 260-63.
.. See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 262 (illustration oflegal incidence of tax on seller).
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seller bears the burden of that tax. 56 Alternatively, the federal
government could impose the statutory burden of the tax on the
gasoline buyer by requiring the buyer to pay an additional $0.60
for each gallon of gasoline purchased. 57 Under this scenario, a
casual observer would conclude that the buyer bears the burden of
tax. 58
In fact, both of these situations are economically
equivalent,59 and how the burden of the tax is shared between the
buyer and the seller under either of these situations cannot be
determined unless an analysis is done regarding the effect of the
tax on the price of the gasoline.
Assume the seller has the legal responsibility to pay the tax.
If the price of gasoline increases by the same $0.60 for which the
seller is legally liable upon the sale of a gallon of gasoline, one can
conclude that the buyer bears the burden or economic incidence of
the tax. 60 On the other hand, if the price to the buyer remains the
same because the seller absorbs the entire tax without increasing
the price, one can conclude that the economic incidence of the tax
falls on the seller. 61 Finally, the seller could pass only a portion of
the tax to the buyer, in which case the economic incidence of the
tax would be shared by the buyer and the seller, even though the
legal incidence is imposed on the seller. 62
A similar analysis can be. used if the legal incidence of the tax
is instead imposed upon the buyer. 63 The results with regard to
how the burden is shared between buyer and seller will be
identical. 64 Because the legal incidence of a tax does not determine
its economic incidence, a tax is more properly described as imposed
upon transactions rather than either buyer or seller. 65 Thus, in
analyzing the distributional effect of a tax, one must look past the

.. ld.
07
ld. at 260 (illustration oflegal incidence of tax on buyer).
.. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 290-91.
.. See id. at 289-91 for a mathematical demonstration of this equivalence. See also
RoSEN, supra note 52, at 260-63.
.. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 290.
•• ld.
62
See id. at 298-95.
.. See id. at 290.
.. ld.
.. See generally supra note 59.
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legal incidence of the tax to the economic incidence. 66 One can not
determine the amount of "tax shifting" that will occur a priori. 61
Conclusions drawn from the foregoing examples can be
extended to other taxes. For example, consider an income tax
where tax rates are equal for all concerned. Inclusion of an
amount in the recipient's income should be the economic
equivalent of denying a deduction for that amount to the payor.
Accordingly, excluding interest payments from a recipient's income
and disallowing a deduction for the interest to the payor would be
equivalent to allowing a deduction to the payor but including the
interest as income to the recipient. In reality, the former method
is likely to have a greater impact on redistribution of wealth
because tax rates vary among taxpayers and, in particular, many
lenders are tax-free entities such as pension funds.
While the legal incidence of the corporate tax is borne by the
corporation, a faceless entity, people must bear the economic
incidence. These people may include the stockholders of the
corporation, the owners of land or equipment leased to the
corporation, lenders to the corporation, employees of the
corporation, and consumers who purchase the corporation's
products. The portion of the tax attributable to the production
process will be borne by the factors of production, including both
the suppliers of capital (i.e., the stockholders, lenders of money,
and lessors of land and equipment) and the laborers (i.e.,
employees). To the extent that the tax is reflected in the price of
the corporation's products, the tax will be borne by consumers.
Complicating the analysis, there are substantial cross-overs in
these roles. For example, laborers may also be consumers.
Likewise, both laborers and consumers may also be stockholders
of the corporation or of another corporation that bears the legal
incidence of the corporate income tax.
The economic incidence of tax affects the distribution of tax
burdens among income classes. Assume the government imposes
a $0.60 per gallon gasoline tax on sellers. Suppose all gasoline
sellers tend to be rich and buyers·tend to be poor. It is unclear
that the poor buyers do not bear a disproportionate share of the
See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 293-95.
"' See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65.
60
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tax. 68 Furthermore, the economic incidence of the tax depends
upon how the tax revenues ~e used. 69 For example, if the
proceeds of the gasoline tax imposed upon the seller of gasoline are
used to feed the homeless, the tax and its disposition will have a
redistributive effect from the wealthier to the poorer.

2. Determining the Economic Incidence of a Tax
The incidence of a tax imposed per unit of product or as a
proportion of the price of a product depends on the elasticities of
supply and demand for that product. 70 The more elastic the
demand curve for the product, 71 the smaller the effect of a per unit
tax on the price of the commodity and therefore, the smaller the
burden of that tax which will be borne by the consumer. 72
Similarly, the more elastic the supply curve for the product, 73 the
smaller the portion of the tax that will be borne by producers74 •
For example, if the demand curve is inelastic because consumers
cannot readily turn to other products as substitutes for the product
to be taxed, a change in price will have very little effect on the
amount demanded and the consumers will bear the greatest
portion of the economic incidence of the tax. 75 Similarly, when
supplyis inelastic, 76 the tax will be borne by the supplier. 77 Ifthe
68
This is an example of a regressive tax. Poor buyers may bear a disproportionate share
of the tax in relation to their income. They will pay a higher percentage of their income on
gasoline, compared to rich buyer8, who have more money to spend. See, e.g. RoSEN, supra
note 52, at 258 (a tax is regressive where the average rate of tax increases as income
decreases).
.. See, e.g. VARIAN, supra note 52, at 256-57.
70
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65.
71
That is, the greater the percentage change in demand that occurs as a result of a one
percent change in price, and therefore, the more responsive the quantity demanded is to a
price change (the flatter the demand curve). See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 265-68.
72
See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 264 .
.,. That is, the greater the percentage change in the supply of a product that will be
forthcoming as a result of a one percent change in its price, and therefore, the more
responsive the quantity supplied is to a price change. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 294.
•• See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 264.
•• The supply and demand functions will be influenced by the degree of competitiveness
in the relevant industry being studied. See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 283-84.
'" Inelastic supply is essentially fixed and is depicted by a vertical or near vertical supply
curve. See id. at 285.
77
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 264.
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supply is perfectly inelastic, i.e., the supply curve is perfectly
vertical because supply is fixed in amount, the producer will bear
the entire burden of the tax because the equilibrium price after
imposition of the tax will remain at the original price, thereby
relieving consumers of the burden of that tax entirely. 78
This analysis applies both to per unit and ad valorem taxes. 79
Ad valorem taxes are taxes imposed as a percentage of the price. 80
For example, the District of Columbia imposes an ad valorem tax
on most goods at the rate of six percent. State and local sales
taxes on food and clothing and the European style of VATs are
examples of ad valorem taxes. 81 The economic analysis involving
shifting curves is somewhat different from that involving a per
unit tax in that the ad valorem tax shifts curves proportionately,
in contrast to a per unit tax, which shifts curves uniformly at each
place along the curve. 82 However, the analysis of economic
incidence of the tax is essentially the same. 83 The incidence of the
tax is determined by the elasticities of supply and demand for the
product. 84
.
As illustrated above, a tax imposed on any product will be
shared by producers and consumers, depending upon the nature of
the supply and demand for the end product. 85 Similarly, a tax
imposed upon a factor of production will be shared between the
supplier of that factor and the business firm that uses the factor
to make the final product. 86 The burden sharing will also be
determined in accordance with the supply and demand functions
for that factor of production. 87 For example, consider the economic
incidence of the payroll taxes used to finance social security.
These taxes are imposed on the worker at the rate of 7.65% of a
See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 293-94; see also RoSEN, supra note 52, at 263-65, (for
graphical analyses of these special cases).
'" See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 265.
80
Id.
•• See id. at 265,447.
82
See id. at 265.
83
See id. at 265-66 (for a graphical analysis of these taxes).
"' See id. at 266.
.. See supra notes 52 - 84, and accompanying text.
88
See id. at 266-68 (for examples of tax on factors of production).
87
Id.
78
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worker's earnings, and on the employer, also at the rate of7.65%
of the worker's earnings. 88 The economic incidence of the total tax
of 15.3% is dependent upon the supply and demand for labor faced
by the particular firm and not simply upon the legal incidence of
the tax. 89 Moreover, different industries face different supply and
demand curves for labor, making a general conclusion about the
economic incidence of payroll taxes impossible to reach without
substantial information on the relevant elasticities of the supply
and demand functions for labor in the industry. 90
The analysis becomes substantially more complicated when it
is extended to an analysis of general equilibrium. General
equilibrium analysis involves looking at the secondary and tertiary
effects of changes to the supply and demand curves of an industry
or factor. 91 For example, suppose a tax is imposed on gasoline as
in the illustration above. A partial equilibrium analysis involves
the determination of the sharing of that tax between buyers and
sellers of gasoline. A general equilibrium analysis involves the
effects on other markets of that portion ofthe,tax borne by buyers
or sellers. If buyers of gasoline are farmers, for instance, and they
bear a portion of the economic incidence of the tax, they may
reduce the use of gasoline and, in turn, reduce production of
agricultural prodU:cts or substitute labor for mechanization, or
both, thereby altering their supply functions. This may reduce the
marginal product oflabor and thereby the equilibrium wage rates
in that industry. In that way, the tax on gasoline may be borne, in
part by farm laborers or, more graphically, perhaps migrant farm
workers who do not even drive or buy gasoline directly. Moreover,
producers of complementary goods and owners of their factors of
production will also be adversely affected. Thus, if the tax is
imposed on an item that has a substantial effect on other markets,
general equilibrium analysis, which takes into account the ways in
which various markets are interrelated, would be necessary in
order to truly understand the economic incidence of the tax.

88
89
00
91

See, e.g. I.R.C. § 3101 (payroll tax on employees) and§ 3111 (payroll tax on employers).
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 274-75.
See id. at 267.
See id. at 27 4.
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Thus, in order to determine who bears the burden of a tax, the
complicated partial and general equilibrium analyses must be
pl,lrsued. The determination involves analysis of market structure,
supply and demand elasticities, mobility of factors of production,
and perhaps many other issues. Many taxes, such as the corporate
income tax, have an uncertain incidence. One can conclude that
a tax imposed on the income of a corporation almost certainly is
not borne entirely by the shareholders of the corporation. 92 Beyond
that, it is very difficult to determine how that tax is shared.
Simple statements about the incidence of a tax tend to be wrong
because of the multiple effects on market equilibrium.

B. Taxation And Efficiency
Because taxes are a means of raising revenue, the minimum
requirement of an efficient tax is that it costs consumers no more
than the taxes collected. On first observation, it would appear that
most taxes achieve that goal, without taking into account the
direct and indirect costs of computing and collecting the tax. 93
However, the potential inefficiency of taxes is much greater than
at first appears. Some taxes distort economic decisions and
arguably result in a loss of general welfare. To the extent that a
tax distorts economic decisions and results in a loss of welfare in
excess of the tax revenues collected, the taxes are said to involve
an "excess burden. ,g4 This "excess burden" is sometimes referred
to as a "welfare cost" or "deadweight loss."95
Excess burden occurs because a tax generally forces consumers
to accept lower amounts of utility than they had previously enjoyed
by choosing a different mix of products, represented by a move to
lower indifference curves. 96 Consumers choose a different mix of
goods in part because the tax reduces the total amount of goods
they can purchase (the wealth effect) and in part because the
consumers substitute other goods for those that are taxed (the
See id. at 282.
.. See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at132-33 (discussing generally the costs of
compliance with the tax laws).
"' See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 297; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 284.
"" See VARIAN, supra note 52, at 295-97.
98
See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 285-88 for a graphical representation of this phenomenon.
02
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substitution effect). 97 The reduction in utility is measured by the
amount of reduced income the consumer necessarily would have
suffered in order to place her at her post-tax level of utility. 98
Thus, the true loss inflicted on the consumer is not the tax paid,
but rather the amount of reduced income that would have caused
the same decrease in utility. 99
In contrast to unit and ad valorem taxes on commodities, an
income tax, which merely reduces the consumer's budget
constraint to a lower level, appears less distortive than a tax on
commodities; however, an income tax distorts the consumer's
choice between leisure and work, and, therefore, between leisure
and all other goods. 100 As such, it too has a distortive effect and
entails an excess burden. 101
The nature and extent of the distortive effect of the income tax
depends upon the following two effects that must be analyzed
independently: (1) the income effect, which is due solely to the loss
of income because relative prices of leisure and other goods are
unaffected; and (2) the substitution effect, which occurs because
the income tax causes leisure to become relatively less expensive
than other commodities, which can only be purchased with income
subject to tax. 102 These effects may be additive or they may be
offsetting. As a matter of pure theory, it is unclear which effect
predominates and, therefore, whether the income tax depresses
the supply oflabor because the substitution effect causes people to
substitute untaxed leisure for taxed work, or whether the income
effect increases the supply of labor because it reduces workers'
wealth and causes them to work more hours in order to sustain
their current standard of living. 103
It should be noted that although most taxes create some
distortion and generate excess burdens, such a burden does not
necessarily mean that the tax is bad. If the government requires
revenue raised through taxes, excess burdens are unavoidable.
"' See
08
See
80
See
100
See
101
See
"" See
103
See

id. at 292; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 104.
RoSEN, supra note 52, at 285-86.
id. at 286-87.
SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 105-06.
RoSEN, supra note 52, at 297-99.
id. at 525.
id. at 376-79 (for a graphical analysis of the effects of an income tax).
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Indeed, even if we could determine the excess burden, society may
be satisfied with a trade-off involving some amount of excess
burden in order to achieve greater faimess, however that may be
defined. Nonetheless, before the trade-off can be evaluated, the
excess burden of a particular tax must be known, and that is a
complicated task.
Moreover, where multiple taxes are used, such as an income
tax in addition to a tax on commodities, it is unclear whether any
one tax increases or decreases distortions. This means that a
single tax cannot be studied in isolation but rather must be studied
in conjunction with all other taxes and perhaps even all other
distorting factors in the economy.
Finally, one can conclude, at least in theory, that the most
efficient tax is the one that minimizes excess burdens. 104 The
overall excess burden will be minimized when the marginal excess
bilrden of the last dollar of revenue raised from each commodity is
the same. 105 To the extent that these marginal excess burdens are
not equal, the overall excess burden can be lowered by raising the
tax rate on the commodity with the smaller marginal excess
burden or by lowering the tax on the commodity with the larger
marginal excess burden. 106 This rule, however, does not translate
into equal tax rates on all commodities. 107 Because elasticities of
demand for commodities differ, the marginal excess burdens may
be equalized with different tax rates applied to various
commodities. 108 This analysis is complicated even further when
one includes income taxation because of the income and
substitution effects with regard to leisure, also a commodity. 109
Moreover, even a tax that minimizes excess burden may not be
acceptable unless society is satisfied that it is "fair." What seems
clear, however, is that simple statements about inefficiencies of
taxes, due to incentive and disincentive effects, are likely to be
misleading oversimplifications.

1..
108
108
107
108
100

See id. at 284.
See id. at 310-13.
ld.
Id.
ld. at 310-13.
See id. at 313.
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PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION

Both the incidence and the efficiency of a tax system depend
upon how taxes affect behavior. 110 An income tax system, even one
that does not contain tax incentive subsidies, influences labor
supply, saving, consumption, and portfolio decisions.m The
current income tax system influences, and is indeed intended to
influence, other behavior, including housing choices, 112 business
equipment purchases, 113 research and experimental
expenditures, 114 expenditures on low income housing, 115 loans to
state and local governments evidenced by state or local bonds, 116
and a myriad of other decisions.

A. Effect on Labor Supply
Perhaps the most important behavioral incentive involves the
effect of the taxation of income itself on the labor supply. 117 As
explained above, an income tax exempts leisure from taxation and,
therefore, causes a substitution ofleisure for other commodities. 118
On the other hand, an income tax also reduces the wealth of the
taxpayer, and therefore, may cause the taxpayer to work more
hours to compensate for the reduced wealth. 119 Accordingly, theory
alone can not predict whether the income tax depresses or
increases the supply oflabor. 120
For a general discussion, see id. at 376-85.
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 102 et seq (illustrating the various influences
of tax on individual behaviors, and how some may work in opposite directions).
112
See, e.g. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3Xdeduction for home mortgage interest).
,,. See, e.g. I.R.C. § 168 (accelerated cost recovery systems for tangible depreciable
property).
n• See I.R.C. § 174 (deduction for research and experimental expenditures) and§ 41
(credit for increasing research activities).
''" See I.R.C. § 42 (credit for building low income housing).
"" See I.R.C. § 103 (interest on state and local bonds excluded from gross income).
117
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 103.
ua See supra notes 102-03, and accompanying text.
llD Id.
120
See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 376-79. See also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: ANew Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1905, 1920 (1987) (discussing the substitution and income effects on taxation); Martin J.
no

111
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The simple analysis above can be most easily understood if the
income tax is assumed to be imposed at a uniform or flat rate. But
even with such a tax, the net impact of the substitution and the
income effects yields uncertainty and, in addition, may yield a
different result for different taxpayers, depending upon their
wealth, level of income, desire for leisure, need for savings, and
non-pecuniary rewards from work. 121
When one complicates the analysis by assuming a progressive
tax in which different levels of income are taxed at different rates,
the analysis can proceed along the same theoretical lines, except
that the after-tax demand curve for leisure is no longer linear, as
it would be with a proportional tax, but becomes convex. 122 The
convexity of the curve demonstrates a greater distortion and
incentive toward leisure at the high end of the income spectrum.
To the extent that there is variation among individuals in the
choice of work or leisure with the imposition of a flat tax, an even
greater variation with the imposition of a graduated tax rate is
likely. 123
One can only determine the effect of the tax on the
work/leisure trade-off empirically, 124 and even then, one is unlikely
to be able to conclude much about its effect on labor without
specifying the type of labor, level of compensation for that labor,
and the supplier of that labor (e.g., male or female, old or young,

McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive
Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 58-59 (1998) (exploring the economic theory underlying the
effect oftax rates on the labor supply and its manifestation in the income and substitution
effects); Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification ofMetaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes
and Human Capital, 51 TAXL. REV. 1, 12 n. 50 (1995) (offering an example of the operation
of the substitution and income effect on consumption).
121
See BANKMAN & GRIFFITH, supra note 120 , at 58-59 (arguing the difficulty that
economic theory has with predicting whether the income or substitution effect will
predominate); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Morelan, Can the Graduated Income Tax
Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51 n.5 (1999) (discussing the income and
substitution effects).
122 See ROSEN, supra note 31, at 378-79 (for a graphical analysis of this phenomenon).
123 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate
and Base, 2 CHAP. L.REV. 197, n. 110 (1999) (arguing that a graduated cash flow tax "may
cause substantial deadweight loss even if the net result of the income and substitution
effects is no change in observed behavior").
124
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 379-80 (summarizing some empirical fmdings). See also
Robert Triest, Fundamental Tax Reform and Labor Supply, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 247,256 (HenryJ. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
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married or single). 125 Indeed, for higher income taxpayers, it is
entirely possible that an increase in the marginal tax rate will
reduce the amount of labor supplied sufficiently to reduce the
overall tax collection from that taxpayer. 126 This is an example of
the "Laffer" curve, which depicts a hypothesis in which a tax rate
exceeding a certain level causes revenue to fall rather than rise. 127
While the Laffer curve relationship has been largely discredited for
taxpayers in general, 128 it has continuing vitality for high marginal
rate taxpayers because it seems clear that the revenue-maximizing
tax rate is not the same for all income groups or for all types of
income. 129 In addition, if tax revenues are used to provide public
goods, there may be a further disincentive towards work and
therefore, an incentive towards leisure. 13° Further, under the
current income tax system, the degree of progressivity is likely to
affect the compensation package oflaborers. High marginal rates
generate non-taxable fringe benefits as a substitute for cash
compensation and stock options as a substitute for cash bonuses.

B. Effect on Saving
Of even greater current interest in the tax policy debate than
the effect of tax rates on the supply of labor, is the effect of tax
rates on saving. 131 The importance of the income tax and high tax
rates on savings is the effect on investment and capital. The
availability of capital to finance investment is dependent upon
savings, and to the extent savings are adversely affected by income

See RoSEN, supra note 52, at 380-82.
See id. at 383-85
121
For a detailed description of the Laffer Curve, see ALFRED L. MAI.ABRE, JR., LoST
PROPHETS 181-82 {1994); see also Joel B. Slemrod, On the High-Income Laffer Curve, in TAX
PROGRESSMTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 177, 203 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 1994).
128
See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 124-125 (noting that all but the "most
ardent supply-siders" believe that labor supply responds significantly to tax cuts); see also
ROSEN, supra note 52, at 384-85.
1211 See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 382-85.
130 See id. at 164-96 (discussion of the influence of welfare as a disincentive to work).
... For a general discussion, see id. at 385-94.
120
128
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taxes, there will be a shortfall in capital and theoretically a decline
in future productivity. 132
Consumption tax proponents argue that income taxation
depresses savings because it alters a taxpayer's choice between
present and future consumption, creating a bias towards present
consumption. 133 This bias occurs because the tax imposed on the
earnings of savings reduces those future earnings. 134 Consumption
tax proponents argue that savings are taxed twice under an income
tax. 135 Because of this double tax, they conclude that the income
tax results in less savings and more present consumption than
would occur in the absence of an income tax. 136
In fact, an economic analysis of the taxation of income,
including earnings on savings, shows a combination of effects, the
net result of which is uncertain. 137 The taxation of interest income,
taken alone, should cause a substitution of current consumption
for future consumption and therefore, a reduction in savings. 138
This is an example of the substitution effect. 139 However, the
taxation of interest income reduces a taxpayers' future wealth and
may cause the taxpayer to save more in order to offset that
reduction in future wealth. 140 This is an example of the income
effect. 141 The substitution effect and the income effect may work
in the same direction, thereby reducing savings, or they may work

See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 119. See also Thomas Michael Federico,
Recent Congresswnal Consumptwn Tax Proposals: A Theoretical Inquiry into their Effects
on the Declining U.S. Saving Rate, 7 U. FLA. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 337, 357 (1996) (savings are
adversely affected under the income tax because they are taxed twice); M. Scotland Morris,
Reframing the Flat Tax Debate: Three Not-So-Easy Steps for Evaluating Radical Tax
Reform Proposals, 48 FLA. L. REv. 159, 172 (1996) (noting that an income tax taxes both
consumption and savings, while a consumption tax does not tax savings).
w See id. See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 168-70.
1M See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 109.
m See FEDERICO, supra note 132, at 357.
"" See, e.g. ARCHER, supra note 3, at 3-4.
117
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 385-94.
118
See id. at 389 (where tax reduces the rate of interest received, the opportunity cost for
consuming a dollar in the present becomes more appealing than consuming that same
dollar, plus the reduced interest, in the future).
111
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 104.
140
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 390.
1•1 Id.
132
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in opposite directions, creating offsetting effects with an uncertain
net result. 142
. To complicate matters further, some returns on savings, such
as capital gains, are not taxed until realized and even then are
taxed at preferential rates, 143 so the current form of the income tax
may involve different substitution and income effects than the
simpler model in which all earnings are taxed at a uniform rate. 144
In addition, with the varying tax rates of a progressive tax system
and varying tradeoffs regarding present and future consumption,
generalizations about the effect of the income tax on savings
become even more suspect. 145 These complications lead one to
conclude that the effect of taxation on savings cannot be predicted
without empirical work. Moreover, since the effect of interest rates
on the magnitude of savings is a subject of controversy, 146 the effect
of taxation on that interest income cannot be determined with
certainty.
Even if high rates of income tax could be shown to depress
desired savings and capital formation, a conclusion about the
advisability of adopting or retaining an income tax would still
require more analysis. The question is not simply whether income
taxation affects capital formation, but rather whether it affects
capital formation more than other alternative methods of taxation.
An answer to this question depends in large part on a
problematical analysis of the incidence of alternative forms of
taxation. 147
Finally, even if the income tax does adversely affect savings or,
conversely, if incentives could be built into the income tax to
encourage savings, the savings would only positively affect
productivity in the economy to the extent they remained available

,., Id.
''" I.R.C. § 1 (h) (maximum capital gain rate). See I.R.C. § 1222 (9) (capital gain net
income defmed).
'" See ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 1115.
146
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 110.
,.. See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform on
Saving, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 83, 96 (Henry J. Aaron &
William G. Gale eds. 1996).
147
See Engen & Gale, supra note 146, at 83-84.
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for domestic uses.
To the extent that savings financed
international investment, the effect on productivity woul~ be nil.

V. DEADWEIGHT LOSS: COST OF ADMINISTERING THE
PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM
A

Direct Costs of the Personal Income Tax System

For simplicity, theoretical analyses of alternative tax systems
in terms of efficiency and equity often assume that tax collection
. involves no direct administrative costs. 148 If one departs from this
unrealistic assumption, one must then evaluate a tax system by
taking into account the costs of running the tax system, which
include the costs of collecting the taxes and the costs incurred by
taxpayers both in complying with the tax system and in planning
within the tax system. Compliance and planning costs include the
professional services of accountants and tax lawyers as well as the
taxpayer's own time and efforts.
Joel Slemrod estimated that the direct cost of running the
Federal income tax system was around $75 billion. 149 This figure
consists of the total compliance cost of the individual income tax
($50 billion), the total compliance cost of the income tax imposed
on businesses other than self-employed individuals ($20 billion),
and the Service budget devoted to income tax ($5 billion). 150
Seventy-five billion total equals about 10% of the revenue collected
from the income tax. 151 This estimate was based on surveys of
2,000 Minnesota taxpayers for studies published by Slemrod and
Sorum and by Slemrod and Blumenthal, in 1982 and 1989,

See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 376- 94 (looking at effect of tax rate and labor supply on
savings at labor supply). Costs of compliance tend to be treated as a separate category of
analysis. See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 131-33; see generally FRONTIERS OF
TAX REFORM, supra note 4 (which sets forth various tax reform proposals, none of which
deal with any specificity with the expected costs of compliance).
"" Joel Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of Them All? in ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 355, 368 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds. 1996).
100
ld. at 357-58.
••• Id. at 358.
148
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respectively. 152 The results were then extrapolated to the entire
Uniteq States. 153
Other studies on taxpayer compliance costs have also been
conducted. The consulting firm of Arthur D. Little (ADL), for
example, in a survey commissioned by the Service to estimate the
paperwork burden of the federal income tax reporting system
estimated that individuals spent approximately 1.6 billion hours
and businesses approximately 2. 7 billion hours on tax compliance
in 1983. 154 James L. Payne translated these time expenditures into
dollar values by multiplying the hours by an appropriate average
hourly value of time adjusted to 1985. 155 This method of analysi~
generated an estimated taxpayer compliance cost for 1985 of
$153.6 billion. 156 If one also included in the computation the cost
of hiring professional assistance, the total cost of taxpayer
compliance would be approximately $159.4 billion for 1985 and
$225.8 billion after adjusting to 1995 dollars. 157 Arthur Hall, using
similar methods, reached a 1995 estimate of taxpayer compliance
cost of $141.4 billion. 158 The principal difference between the
estimates of Payne and Hall, which Slemrod views as too high, 159
and Slemrod's own estimates involves the much higher average
value on time spent on tax compliance used by Payne and Hall
than by Slemrod. 160
Based upon a study commissioned by the Service, Robert Hall
and Alvin Rabushka indicate that the direct costs of running the
federal income tax system would be $159 billion per year in

162
See ld. at 361, ·n.9.
,.. See id. at 363.
,.. See I d. at 364-65; but see SLEMROD & BAIOJA. supra note 4, at 132-33 (arguing that the
studies on the costs of compliance conducted by Arthur D. Little, and relied upon by the
Service, were flawed and thus make any estimates based upon them unreliable).
160
See SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365. See generally JAMES PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS:

THE BURDEN OF THE U.S. TAX SYsTEM (1993).
108
SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365. See also ARTHUR D. LITI'LE, DEVELOPMENT IN
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING THE TAXPAYER PAPERWORK BURDEN, 1-7 (1988).
167
/d. at 369.
,.. Id. at 366. See also Arthur P. Hall, Compliance Costs of Alternative Tax Systems,
Ways and Means Testimony, Tax Foundation, Special Brief(June); see also Replacing the
·Federal Income Tax: Hearings Before the House comm. On Ways and Means, 1041h Cong.
164 (1995) (Arthur P. Hall testifying).
169
See id.
80
'
Id.
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1985. 161 In their own estimate of direct costs, Hall and Rabushka
include a minimum of $100 billion in taxpayer compliance costs,
including costs of filing and buying expert advice. 162 They estimate
the costs of planning, such as consulting with lawyers and other
tax planners, to be at least another $35 billion. 163 Lobbyists add
another $50 billion, 164 for a total of at least $185 billion per year in
direct costs. These estimates do not attempt to account for
·imperfections of the system, which, for example, Hall and
Rabushka estimate allow $100 billion to escape taxation through
tax evasion. 165 · Nor do they deal with the indirect costs of the
present system, including disincentive effects that reduce output
and cause a misallocation of resources, which Payne estimates to
approach $200 billion. 166 Hall and Rabushka's estimates also do
not account for the cost to the Service of administering the tax
laws, estimated by Slemrod at approximately $5 billion. 167
Thus, in contrast to the theorizing done to estimate and
evaluate the excess burdens resulting from the taxes themselves,
the administrative costs of running the current system are much
clearer and impose a significant deadweight loss on the economy.
Moreover, there is no question regarding offsetting effects that
may be involved. Administrative costs, including both those
incurred by the government tax collectors and the taxpayers
subjected to the tax, reduce social welfare. Whether those
administrative costs amount to $75 billion, $159 billion, or even
$275 billion, they are nevertheless very large. Further changes
brought about by the tax legislation of 1993 and 1997/68 which

161
HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 7; but see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at
132-33 (arguing that the studies on the costs of compliance conducted by Arthur D. Little,
and relied upon by the Service were flawed and thus make any estimates based upon them
unreliable).
182
HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 11-12 (noting that the advent of computer tax
software may help to reduce the costs of compliance).
163
Id. at 19.
164
Id.
166
Id. at 15.
166 SLEMROD, supra note 149, at 365, n.18; see also PAYNE, supra note 155.
167
Id. at 368.
166
See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
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have arguably added additional complexity to the system, 169 may
have increased these costs.
In addition, tax evasion involves societal costs in addition to
the lost revenue, estimated by Hall and Rabashka at $100
billion. 170 A tax system that is prone to tax evasion is one that will
involve ·even greater administrative costs since the revenue
collectors expend a portion of their budget to stop the evasion. 17 ~
A tax system that can be avoided is likely to generate an
underground economy in which incentives and prices differ from
the legal economy, likely adding to inefficiencies in the economy. 172
Administrative and compliance costs can substantially affect
the excess burdens resulting from a tax system and, therefore, its
desirability. A tax system that minimizes administrative and
compliance costs is a system that should enjoy a presumption of
greater ·efficiency than a tax system which involves substantial
administrative and compliance costs. While minimizing these
costs should not be the only objective of tax reform or the sole
determinant for the selection of a tax system, it is surely an
important factor that must be carefully considered in evaluating
competing systems.
Whatever the merits of the arguments regarding the incidence
of the income tax and the direction and seriousness of the
disincentives towards work and savings, it cannot be
overemphasized that the current income tax system is very
expensive to administer, both to the government and to the
taxpayers who are subjected to it. 173 Further, the system fails to
take advantage of technological capabilities regarding electronic
money transfers that have been developed during the last few
years. 174 Instead, the income tax system is based upon a method

Additional changes in the tax law tend to add to complexity. See, e.g. SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 141 (noting that the tax code becomes more complex as each lobby
group gets input).
·
170
HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 15.
111 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 149.
112
See id. at 151-52.
113
See supra notes 149-72 and accompanying text.
114
Computer technology, however, has, to be sure, assisted in compliance. But, computer
assistance in compliance may have fostered additional computational complexity. See, e.g.
George Guttman, Microsoft Launches Tax Software Product, 85 TAX NOTES 1628 (1999).
169
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of collection and record keeping that was acceptable in the early
part of the Twentieth Century. 175 It relies upon an annual selfassessment by the taxpayer whereby each taxpayer must
separately compile the relevant information and compute the
income tax. Thus far, even attempts to move the system into a
paperless tax return system, thereby making use of computer
technology, have been unsuccessful. 176
The direct costs of running an income tax system create a
substantial burden to the economy. 177 The income tax is often
defended, however, as a means of attaining fairness in burden
sharing. 178 Nevertheless, if revenue could be collected in a
substantially more efficient way, the economy would benefit.

B. An Explanation of Why the Personal Income
Tax System is Costly
The. reasons for the high direct cost of the current income tax
system include the following: (1) the antiquated method of
computing and reporting annual income/79 (2) the excessive
personalizing-of the income tax in order to achieve a perceived
Furthermore, although President Clinton has proposed an electronic filing credit, where
taxpayers get an additional $10 credit for filing electronically, tax analysts are skeptical as
to whether it would significantly increase electronic filings, as well as concern that it add
to an already profligate system of tax credits. See George Guttman, News Analysis: Clinton
Administration Wants Electronic filing Credit, 86 TAX NOTES 451, 451-454 (2000).
115
See FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the "structural and
policy conflicts have changed little over time" in the tax provisions). See for example George
Guttman, Electronic Tax Administration: Still a Long Way To Go, 81 TAX NOTES 811, 81517 (1998) (one barrier to the implementation of a new electronic filing system includes the
continued requirement for actual signatures).
118
Despite publicity, the IRS does not get many electronic returns. Many people still flle
paper returns. See, e.g. George Guttman, News Analysis- Deja Vu -IRS Unlikely to Hit
Electronic Filing Goals, 84 STATE TAX NOTES 200, 200 (1999) (a target rate of80% eJectronic
filings was set to be achieved by 2007; currently, only 8% of filings are undertaken
electronically). See also generally supra notes 174-75.
m See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 128.
118
See id. at 49, 135. See also GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX,
supra note 4, at 222 ("More than eighty years ago when this nation adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment, achieving fairness in the distribution of the tax burden was the essential
reason for taxing income and for taxing it at progressive rates."); see generally Erik M.
Jensen, Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes and The Sixteenth Amendment, 84 Tax
NOTES 1089 (1999).
119
See generally FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 4.
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fairness or to reward or provide incentives for particular behavior;
(3) the lines that must be drawn to measure accurately a
taxpayer's personal income; 180 and (4) the imposition of tax on
complex financial transactions (e.g., sales of stock and corporateshareholder transactions.)
The first of these elements, the taxpayer's annual selfassessment of tax based upon annual reporting of income and
deductions, results from a system that was designed in 1913.
Based on that model, the income tax has become substantially
more complicated. The current system is encumbered with
multiple phase-outs for such items as personal exemptions,
itemized deductions, and various educational tax credits. 181 It also
contains complicating features in the computation of taxable
income, such as the passive activity loss rules, 182 at-risk rules, 183
and net operating loss carryovers. 184 To the extent record keeping
and the interrelationship of years becomes more difficult, audits
become more difficult and collection of tax rightfully owing
becomes more problematic.
The second element contributing to the inadequacy of the
present income tax system is the virtually unending desire to
personalize the tax so as to achieve fairness. 185 This desire has
resulted in progressive rates, 186 rates depending upon marital
status, 187 exemptions for children and other dependents, 188 phaseouts of various deductions, 189 and other benefits as the level of a
taxpayer's income increases. Further, the desire to reward or
provide incentives for certain behavior by reducing a taxpayer's

180
Measurement could involve determining whether an item of receipt constitutes income
and whether an expenditure is a nondeductible personal expense or a deductible business
expense incurred to earn income.
181
See, e.g. I.R.C. § 63(d) (itemized deductions); § § 151-53 (personal exemptions); §25A
(educational tax credits).
182
See I.R.C. § 469.
183
See I.R.C. § 465 .
... See I.R.C. § 172(b)
... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 135 .
... See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11.
187
See I.R.C. § 1.
188
See I.R.C. § 151(c).
189

See I.R.C. § 68; § 25A.
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income tax burden has led to tax benefits for charitable
contributions, 190 the retention of the personal deduction for home
mortgage interest, 191 and various business credits and
deductions, 192 again just to name a few.
The income tax system is prone to these personalizing
features, in part, because the annual computation of tax required
of both businesses and individual taxpayers permits the
personalizing features to be accounted as an aggregate for the year
during the annual computation. Each feature in and of itself is
manageable; however, the combination of features becomes
burdensome and complicated, often requiring expensive
professional assistance and, at the very least for many taxpayers,
computer assistance.
The third element is the line drawing that must be done to
determine whether receipts or benefits are income and whether
expenses are deductible. 193 Often, these determinations must be
done in the context of receipts and expenditures that occupy some
middle ground. For example, some expenditures are a mixture of
business and personal expenses. 194 Moreover, some expenses are
almost purely personal but are reported by taxpayers as deductible
business expenses. 195 Importantly, even if the tax were made
computationally simple, flat, and unpersonalized, the line drawing
inherent in measuring income would leave the tax complex and
costly.
The fourth element involves the imposition of tax on purely
financial transactions such as sales or exchanges of investment
assets. Investment gains from these transactions derived by
individual taxpayers are not included in the accounting for
national income and gross domestic product although, under a
personal income tax system, these gains may increase a taxpayer's
See I.R.C. § 170.
See I.R.C. §163 (h)(3).
192
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
103
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 139.
1
"'
See, e.g. I.R.C. § 119 (meals and deductions furnished for convenience of employer may
be considered both personal and business).
196
The deduction for travel and entertainment expenses under I.R.C. § 162 represents an
area of both potential and historical abuse. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at
262-65.
100
101
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income. 196 Sales of stock, corporate-shareholder transactions such
as corporate liquidations and redemptions, and certain
partnership-partner transactions are examples of financial
transactions that can generate gross income under the current tax
system. 197 The issues regarding the preference accorded capital
gains, 198 tax-free corporate reorganizations, 199 and like-kind
exchanges200 grow out of this aspect of the personal income tax
system.
Critics of the income tax have focused on an altemative base
for the collection of revenue, both to avoid the purported economic
disincentives to work and save and to achieve more efficiency in
the tax assessment process. 201 However, these critics have often
conceded that the altemative base may not achieve the fairness, at
least in the abstract, that the income tax appears to achieve. 202
This paper emphasizes the importance of an efficient and
inexpensive tax collection system and concludes that an income tax
that is annual, self-assessed, and imposed directly on the income
of individuals can never be made efficient and inexpensive.
VI. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF TAXATION

A. Alternative Methods of Taxing Consumption
The use of consumption instead of income as a tax base has
gained momentum among some tax reformers. 203 Such a system
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins ofCapital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do
With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 891 (1985).
107
See I.R.C. § 302 (distributions in redemption of stock); §331 (distributions to
shareholders in complete liquidation); § 731 (a) (distributions by a partnership to a partner
of cash in excess of the partner's basis in partnership interest);§ 741 (sale or exchange of
partnership interest).
188
See I.R.C. § 1(h).
190

188

See I.R.C. § 368.

See I.R.C. § 1031.
201
See generally HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4; Murray Weidenbaum, The NunnDomenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons in FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 54 (1996);
Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax Reform in
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 70 (1996); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption
Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales Tax Example, FuNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, 160 (1996).
202
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 171.
,.. See supra note 201.
200
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taxes current consumption, i.e., the quantity of commodities sold
to or consumed by an individual. In contrast, an income tax
imposes a tax burden on potential consumption, which includes
both current consumption and the savings available for future
consumption.
Proponents of a consumption tax contend that a change from
a graduated rate income tax to a consumption tax will encourage
saving and increase the amount of capital stock available for
investment, thereby increasing productivity and output. 204
Increased saving will result from a reduced disincentive to save205
and a shift in the tax burden from high income taxpayers, who
tend to have high savings rates, to low income taxpayers, who tend
to have low savings rates. 206 As discussed earlier in this paper, the
first of these outcomes, although perhaps intuitively likely, is open
to substantial question. 207 . The second outcome results from a
redistribution of the tax burden from the wealthy to the less
wealthy, which many are likely to find unacceptable even taking
into account the additional savings that may result, at least in the
absence of compensating public expenditures benefitting the less
wealthy. 208
The principle altemative methods of imposing a consumption
tax are (1) a national retail sales tax; (2) a value-added tax; (3) the
Hall-Rabushka flat tax; and (4) a cash-flow or consumed income
tax.

1. Retail Sales Tax
A retail sales tax imposes a tax on the purchase of
commodities, which could include labor. 209 A general sales tax
""' See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 71; Weidenbaum, supra note 201, at 59-62;
Metcalf, supra note 201, at 98-100; Kotlik.off, supra note 201, at 176-77. ·
"'" See id.
"'" See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 171-73 (lower income taxpayers need to
consume a larger proportion of their income to live, therefore will have lower savings rates
than wealthier taxpayers; thus lower income taxpayers will bear a greater burden for tax
under a consumption model).
207
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 390; SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 110 (illustrating
where a consumption tax could have a negative impact on saving).
200
See supra notes 68 and 206.
209
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 441.
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imposes that tax at a uniform rate. 210 In contrast to a general sales
tax, a selective sales tax or excise tax is levied at different rates
(including zero) on different commodities. 211 A uniform rate
national sales tax, however, is much simpler to administer than a
sales tax involving differential rates in that it is easier to collect
and easier to police. 212
The national sales tax under consideration is generally
described as an ad valorum tax. 213 Sales at stages earlier than the
retail level are not subject to the tax. 214 This exemption of nonretail sales avoids the cascading effect of tax imposed at each stage
of production215 and thereby avoids discriminating against nonvertically integrated companies in favor of vertically integrated
companies. 216 Imposing the tax on the gross amount of retail sales
ensures that all of the component costs of production (i.e., raw
materials, labor, etc.) as well as returns on capital (i.e., interest,
rent, and profits) will be in the tax base because they will be
reflected in the price of the product.
As discussed earlier, a single rate national sales tax does not
guarantee the elimination of excess burdens. 217 Because different

210

Id.

211
Id. at 442 (selective sales tax also referred to as "an excise tax, or a differential
commodity tax).
212
See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales
Tax Example, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 160, 170, (Michael J. Boskin ed. 1996)
(describing the general features of the retail sales tax); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4,
at 196 (providing an overview of the functioning of the retail sales tax).
210
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 442 (an ad valorem tax is calculated based on the
percentage of the purchase price); Kotlikoff, supra note 212, at 176 (describing a tax based
on a percentage of purchase price).
21
• See Malcolm Gillis, Peter Mieskowski, & George R. Zodrow,Indirect Consumption
Taxes: Common Issues and Differences Among Alternative Approaches, 51 TAXL. REV. 725,
731 (1996) (contrasting the retail sales tax, which does not tax business inputs, with the
business transfer tax and the value-added tax methods); Alan Schenk, The Plethora of
Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Tax, Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA
Tax Into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281, 1315 (noting that a feature of the retail
sales tax is to refrain from taxing purchases by businesses for resale).
215
See SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1315 (discussing the effect of cascading). See also
Joseph Isenbergh, The End ofIncome Taxation, 45 TAXL. REV. 283,332 (1990) (discussing
the impact of cascading on consumers); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 209 (detailing
the distorting effect of cascading on consumers).
218 ld.
217 See supra, note 99 and accompanying text.
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commodities face different demand structures, a uniform rate does
not assure that the marginal excess burden imposed on each
commodity will be equal. Consequently, an excess burden may
occur.
The conventional argument against a national sales tax is that
it would be regressive. 218 The reasoning for this view is that
wealthy people consume a smaller portion of their income than less
wealthy people. It would follow that a tax based on consumption
will be paid by poor people at a disproportionately higher rate
relative to income than by wealthy people. 219
However, this line of reasoning assumes that the current
year's income is an accurate reflection of a taxpayer's lifetime
income. Further, it is not at all certain that over a lifetime, a poor
person pays a disproportionately larger share of her income for
consumption expenditures than a wealthy person. 220 In fact, there
is reasonably strong evidence that people at all levels of income
devote about the same proportion of their income to consumption
expenditures. 221 If this is the case, a sales tax is neither regressive
nor progressive over a taxpayer's lifetime.
In addi~ion, the conventional view looks only at the legal
incidence of the sales tax. It ignores the analysis of the economic
incidence of a tax. Although the legal incidence of a sales tax falls
on sellers, it appears to fall on consumers immediately through an
increase in price. However, a tax on goods is shifted and shared
between buyers and sellers of the good, depending upon the
elasticities of supply and demand for the good. 222 To the extent the
seller bears a portion of the burden, the tax may again be shifted
118

See, e.g. Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales
Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 110,117 (Michael Boskin ed. 1996).
••• See MOORE, supra note 218, at 117 (noting the argument against the retail sales tax
based on progressivity and offering different solutions based on rebates and credits);
Kotlikoff, supra note 212, at 171; Gillis et al., supra note 214, at 734 (noting the concerns
voiced about the adverse impact on the poor from the administration of a consumption tax).
220
See KOTUKOFF, supra note 218, at 171(arguing for the measurement of progressivity
of the retail sales tax of lifetime rather than annual income); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 4, at 219 (noting that consumption taxes such as the retail sales tax and the value
added tax imparts a burden to taxpayers in proportion to their lifetime incomes).
111
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 445, citing METCALF, THE LIFETIME INCIDENCE OF STATE
AND LoCAL TAXES: MEASURING CHANGES DURING THE 1980'S (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 4252, Jan. 1993).
111
See supra, notes 52-92 and accompanying text ..
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to factors of production for the good, including owners of capital as
well as labor. As a result, the distributional effect of a national
sales tax is uncertain.
Detractors of the sales tax suggest that without an army of
administrators to monitor its collection and payment to the
government, any savings resulting from the surface simplicity of
the tax would be outweighed by the loss of tax revenue from
cheating. 223 Under the methods of collection of the sales tax
currently employed in an economy that uses currency as a
significant medium of exchange, loss of revenue through lack of
compliance is potentially substantial.

2. Value-Added Tax
A value-added tax (VAT) is, in substance, a form of a retail
sales tax. 224 Its advantages over a retail sales tax lie in its
compliance properties and its built-in protection from evasion. 225
A VAT is collected in stages. 226 Each producer pays a tax on the
value added to the product being sold. 227 The tax is implemented
by means of a tax imposed at the full rate on the full value of the
product when sold at retail. 228 Thus, the price of the product to the
consumer includes the tax computed by applying the VAT rate to
the·tax-exclusive price of the product or service. 229
Under a credit-style VAT, the retail seller is permitted a credit
against the tax that must be remitted upon retail sale of the

See SLEMROD & BAKJJA, supra note 4, at 210 (discussing the enormous enforcement
challenges inherent in the retail sales tax model); MOORE, supra note 212, at 117 (Michael
Boskin ed. 1996) (recognizing the evasion argun:ient against the retail sales tax and arguing
that states should be held responsible to collect the tax); SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1315
(noting the difficulty of enforcement and collection of the retail sales tax and positing that
problem of enforcement in the retail sales tax paradigm may be solved with the cooperation
of states).
224
See DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN ~ONSUMPI'ION TAXATION 7 (1996).
223
See Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax Have a Place .in the
Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207, 285 (1987).
228
See Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21"' Century: The Role for a Consumption
Tax, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 139 (1999).
227
See id.
228
See id. at 139-140.
229
Seeid.
223
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product. 230 The credit equals the VAT that the seller paid for raw
materials, which was included in the price paid by the seller. 231 In
this manner, the retail seller is required only to remit a net tax
payment equivalent to the VAT rate times the value which the
retail seller added to the product. 232 Thus, a credit style VAT
collects a tax at each stage of production through ultimate retail
sale, but the aggregate amount of tax collected is no greater than
the amount that would be collected as a retail sales tax at the final
sale. 233 To the extent the ultimate retail seller fails to pay over the
VAT portion of a sale, it will not be entitled to its credit. 234 Only
the tax on the retailer's mark-up will be lost. 235
A subtraction-style VAT is collected at each stage of
production, but the tax due at each stage is computed by
multiplying the VAT rate by the excess of the gross receipts over
deductible expenditures of the payor. 236 The cost of raw materials·
and capital are deductible in computing value added. 237 In
contrast, the cost of labor and returns on capital are not
deductible. 238 Facially, a subtraction style VAT resembles the
corporate income tax, except that investments are expensed and no
deduction is allowed for labor and interest costs. 239
Both types of VATs may properly be viewed as alternative
methods for collecting a retail sales tax and both impose tax on a
consumption base. 240 Like a retail sales tax, a VAT can be imposed

See METCALF, supra note 201, at 93-94; Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226,
at 139-40.
... ld.
210

See Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226, at 139-140.
See id.
See METCALF, supra note 201, at 96 .
Id.
See Schenk, Radical Tax Reform, supra note 226, at 94.
137
See generally U.S. DEP'r OF TREAsURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, vol. 3 (1984) The cost of capital is only fully deductible in a
consumption style VAT, not a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Income Type VAT. Id. at
5-7 .
... See id. See also METCALF, supra note 201, at 92 (value added includes the value of
labor and return to capital, so would be included in the tax base).
... See U.S. DEP'r OF TREAsURY, supra note 237, at 7-8; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
4, at 197-99.
140
See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 226.
232

...
...
...
...
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at different rates for different commodities, but a non-uniform rate
of taxation increases administrative complexity and the cost of
compliance. 241 A progressive rate may introduce potential
additional inefficiencies, although this latter point is by no means
certain. 242 Because the taxes are incorporated in the price of the
product to be paid by the consumer, and the seller is charged with
the obligation of paying the tax to the government, the retail sales
tax and both styles of VAT impose the legal incidence of the tax on
businesses. As discussed earlier, the imposition of the legal
incidence of the tax on the seller does not ensure or even indicate
that the economic incidence of the tax is borne by the seller. 243 Note
that a VAT can also be imposed on an income base. 244
Transition problems presented by alternative consumption
proposals vary significantly. An indirect tax such as a VAT or
retail sales tax will cause a one-time increase in price levels and,
therefore, a one-time devaluation of existing wealth. 245 The
transition loss to capital by virtue of its reduced purchasing power
may be an appropriate trade-off for the preferential treatment that
it would receive in the future.

3. Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax
The Hall-Rabushka flat tax is a consumption tax with
collection aspects similar, at least in part, to an income tax. 246 In
essence, the Hall-Rabuska flat tax is a subtraction·type VAT with
a special allowance as a deduction for compensation for services. 247
The amount paid as compensation for services, however, does not
escape the consumption tax base but rather is includable on the
special tax return of the taxpayers who receive the
See id. at 237.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 237, at 90-110 9(discussing the impact of
different ways of making the VAT more progressive).
... See supra, notes 52-92 and accompanying text.
244
That possibility will be discussed infra at part VI. B.
... See David F. Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in
241

242

FRONTIERSOFTAXREFORM 123, 135 (Michael Boskin ed. 1996); Schenk, Value Added Tax,
supra note 225, at 237; Gillis et al., supra note 214, at 751-752.
248
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 8.
247
See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 55.

HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 38 2000-2001

2000]

The Transition to a. Currency-Free Economy

39

compensation. 248 Thus, in theory, the economic incidence of the
Hall-Rabushka flat tax is the same as that of a VAT, even though
the legal incidence of the portion attributable to compensation for
personal services is imposed upon the individual service
providers. 249
The shift in the legal incidence of the Hall-Rabushka flat tax
and the place where personal services tax is collected, permits the
taxation of personal services income to be imposed at a different
rate and on less than all of the taxpayer's personal service
income. 250 Thus, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax modification of a
subtraction-type VAT permits flexibility insofar as the tax
attributable to personal service income can be made progressive
and can include a low income allowance, permitting some low paid
workers to escape that portion of the tax altogether. 251
Because the precise form of the Hall-Rabushka flat tax
proposal does not take advantage of the complete flexibility to
impose the tax on personal services in a progressive manner, as
that term is normally used by income tax advocates, 252 it leaves the
economic incidence of the VAT largely unchanged. 253 However, it
could be modified (undoubtedly without the consent ofMessrs. Hall
and Rabushka) to be more progressive.
Transition issues under the Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax are
similar to those under the indirect consumption taxes discussed
previously.

4. Cash Flow Consumed Income Tax
The last type of consumption tax imposes legal incidence on
individuals instead of businesses. The cash flow tax is computed
and collected at the individuallevel. 254 The taxpayer includes all
See id.
See id. at 60.
,.. See id. at 59.
261
See id.
262
See, e.g. SCHENK, supra note 214, at 1299, 1313 (comparing the VAT and the Hall &
Rabushka flat tax).
... See HALL & BABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing variants on the flat tax and its
effects on rates).
264
See generally ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 1120.
248
249
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income, both from labor as well as from capital, and subtracts
savings. 255 The amount remaining after the subtraction constitutes
the taxpayer's consumption and is subject to the tax. 256
Administratively, this type of consumption tax is problematic
since a method must be devised to establish the amount of a
taxpayer's savings. The likely solution would be to designate
qualified accounts at savings banks, security brokerage houses,
and other types of financial institutions to track these savings. 257
As long as capital gains were retained in those accounts, no tax
would be imposed. Withdrawals from these accounts that are not
offset by contributions to the same or other qualified accounts,
however, would be added to the tax base and subject to tax.
Under the cash flow tax, the taxation of consumption can be
personalized. Thus, the rates can be made progressive, the tax can
contain various exemptions and deductions for special
circumstances, and the tax system is as susceptible to built-in tax
incentives, known as tax expenditures, as the current tax
system. 258 For that reason, the cash flow tax is likely to encounter
the same criticisms of expensive administration and inefficiency as
the current income tax.
Transition issues in moving to a consumed income tax are
quite significant. A consumed income tax would be very dependent
upon an honest accounting for wealth existing at the time of its
adoption. Otherwise, the tax would be easily avoidable through
post-enactment savings derived from unreported but existing
wealth. Accounting for that existing wealth as of the time of
adoption to ensure that it does not appear as new savings, as well
as accounting for the basis of assets that are currently owned by
individuals, present great transition problems .

... ld. at 1149.
... [d.

See, e.g. Robert A. O'Neill & Paul H. Lutz, Unlimited Sauings Allowance (USA) Tax
System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482, 1522 (1995) (Describing the type of form which would be used
to keep track of savings and investments).
.,. See, e.g. DOMENICI, supra note 3, at 296.
257
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B. Reconciling National Income Accounting with
the Consumption Tax and Income Tax
1.

Relationship of Taxation to the Flow of Goods and Services

Because each of the various consumption tax proposals chooses
a different place in the production and sale of goods cycle to impose
the tax, the best way to understand the consumption tax reform
proposals is to understand first the flow of goods ru;td services and
the factors of production. The selection of the point of imposition
of the tax determines how the base is calculated, the
proportionality of the tax, and how the tax can be collected, but it
does not itself determine who ultimately bears the burden of the
tax, i.e. its economic incidence (assuming equivalent tax rates are
employed).
By definition, national income (Y) and domestic product are
equal. That is because domestic product represents the firms'
response to aggregate demand for goods and services, whether
arising from consumers (C), investors (1), the government (G) or
net exports, i.e. exports (X) minus imports (IM) or (X - IM). 259
Production equal to the domestic product satisfies that aggregate
demand. 260 The amount of the domestic product, when paid out to
the factors of production and as profits, represents income to those
recipients. 261 Thus, when wages, interests, rents, and profits in the
economy are combined to compute national income, that amount
equals the value of the output in the economy, which in turn,
equals the aggregate demand for goods and services. 262
The income tax for the most part is imposed on national
income, i.e., wages, interest, rents and profits. If one desired to
impose a tax on consumption alone, however, one could tax
national income in the hands of its recipients, excluding the
amount that recipients save (Y - 8). The cash flow consumed

... See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32.
See id. at 31, 309.
281
See id. at 31-32.
282
See id.
280
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income tax and its recent legislative reflection, the "NunnDomenici USA Tax", employ this approach. 263
Alternatively, one could tax income or consumption by focusing
on aggregate demand. Specifically, one could impose a tax on
private consumption by taxing aggregate demand less investment
and government spending. 264 The tax would be incorporated into ·
the prices of goods that were consumed: The retail sales tax
(which excludes business purchases) as well as the credit and
subtraction method consumption VATs employ this latter
approach.
The foregoing method can be used to impose an income tax as
well. One could tax income by imposing an ad valorem tax on
aggregate demand, including consumer demand, investment
demand, government purchases, and net exports. This tax could
be imposed statutorily on the purchasers of domestic product265 or,
as with regard to most sales taxes and value-added taxes, on the
sellers of those products, but collected, at least in part, from
_purchasers.
Under this latter method, the tax would be
incorporated into the prices of the goods and services.
The primary difference between an income VAT and a
consumption VAT lies in the treatment of investment
expenditures. In contrast to a consumption VAT, no deduction or
credit would be permitted under an income VAT with regard to the
business firm's purchase of investment goods such as plant and
equipment. 266
In lieu of complete expensing or credit, a
depreciation allowance, in the case of a subtraction method VAT,
or amortization of the credit resulting from the purchase of
investment goods, in the case of a credit VAT, would be allowed. 267
In either event, net investment would be part of the tax base of the
business firm, thereby causing the VAT to be an income VAT

The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax employs this approach in part but combines it with a
separate business tax component in the form of a subtraction style VAT. See S. 722, 10411>
Cong., l't Sess. (1995), supra note 3. For a succinct description of the proposal, see
Weidenbaum, supra note 201, at 54.
... This tax could be imposed with or without net exports and with or without government
purchases.
... See supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
288
See U.S. DEJ>'T OF TREAsURY, supra note 237,5-7.
287
See id.
283
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because it imposes a tax on income, not just consumption268 The
economic incidence of the portion of the tax attributable to
inclusion of investment expenditures in the tax base would fall on
the owners of the factors of production, including capital and labor,
and on consumers, 269 with the exact sharing ratios dependent upon
elasticities. Moreover, it should be noted that since both private
and government saving must be equal to investment, disallowing
a deduction or credit for investment spending under a VAT is the
counterpart to taxing saving under a personal income tax. 270 The
legal incidence, however, would be different.
Finally, an income VAT, coupled with a tax on personal service
income to the service provider and a credit to the employer to
achieve progressivity, could be modified into a personal income tax
by adding a separate tax on gains from sales of investment
property, i.e., capital gain. An income VAT and separate taxation
of capital gain, however, do not lend themselves to automatic
point-of-sale collection. 271
2.

Personal Income Tax and the flow of Goods and Services

In contrast to the manner of taxing national income described
above, the income tax system currently in force actually imposes
a tax on a broader base than national income. 272 The current
income tax adopts a definition of income different from national
income. Under the current income tax system, personal income is
determined at the taxpayer level, and is generally "defined as the
algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question. "273 This definition, sometimes referred to as the "HaigSimons" definition of income, after the economist Robert Haig, who

208
208
210
271

212
27
'

See id.
See id. at 6-7.
See, e.g. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 71.
See ROSEN, supra note 52, at 44 7.
See I.R.C. § 61(setting forth what is includable as taxable income).
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
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articulated the definition first in 1921,274 and Henry Simons, who
modified it in 1938, 275 is the most widely accepted definition of
income and is used by many economists and lawyers as the basis
for testing the equity of the personal income tax. 276
Like a tax on national income, the personal income t.ax base
includes income from wages, interest, rent, and profits when
realized. 277 It also includes, however, some transfers between
individuals, such as found property, which may or may not be
deductible by the person who lost the property. 278
More
importantly, the current income tax system taxes appreciation in
a taxpayer's property. 279
This appreciation can be either
appreciation in financial assets or appreciation in other investment
property. 280 Appreciation in financial assets essentially represents
the present discounted value of the flow of future expected income
from the property or business entity the ownership of which is
evidenced by the financial asset. Appreciation can take place
either because the flow of income from the entity has increased,
the discount factor has decreased, or the price-earnings multiple
has increased because of changes in speculative interest in the
financial asset. Regardless of the reason for the appreciation, the
current income tax imposes a tax on that appreciation, generally
at more favorable capital gains rates, when the appreciation has
been "realized."281 This is true even though the future earnings,
when realized, would themselves be subject to income tax. 282
RO~ERT HAIG,

.

THE CONCEPI' OF INCOME (1921)
..,. See supra note 272.
1711
See FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 1, at 107; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 339342.
271
See I.R.C. §61.
1711
See Treas. Reg. §1.6-14(a) and Cesarini u. United States, 296 F.Supp., 3 (N.D. Ohio,
1969) affirmed 428 F.2d 812 (found money included in income); I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)
("treatment of casualty gains and losses:" "net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it
exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income").
279
See, e.g. I.R.C. § 1001.
280
See I.R.C. § 1221.
281 See I.R.C. § 1(h)
282
Sometimes, however, a tax on appreciation will offset taxes on future earnings. An
example is the effect of adjustments under I.R. C. §§ 734(b) and 743(b) when a § 754 election
is in effect for a partnership. Sometimes, on the other hand, no adjustment is made. For
example, the sale of corporate stock for a profit does not give rise to an upward adjustment
in the basis of the corporation's assets because there is a separate basis in the stock and a
274
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The appropriateness of taxing this appreciation in financial
assets represents one aspect of the long-running debate regarding
whether capital gains should be taxed preferentially. 283 In any
event, if an income tax were enacted providing for collection by
imposing a tax on purchases, a separate capital gains tax would be
required in order to match the tax base of the current personal
income tax.

3. Treatment of Capital Gain
In contrast to the Haig-Simons definition of personal income
discussed above, 284 the definition of national income from a
macroeconomic viewpoint stems from the definition of gross
domestic product. 285 It is the sum of the incomes that all
individuals in the economy earned in the form of wages, interest,
rents, and profits. 286 The major difference in the two definitions is
the treatment of gains from financial transactions such as from the
sale of investment assets. Thus, an individual's gain from the sale
of stock in a corporation would be includable in income under the
Haig-Simons definition of income. Such a gain, however, is not
included in the macroeconomic concept of national income. As a
result, the current income tax system, which imposes a tax on
capital gains, captures a broader base than the nation's national
income when viewed without regard to special exemptions and
deductions unrelated to the measurement of income
An indirect tax such as a income VAT would tax gross
domestic product and, therefore, income in the national income
context, but would not tax an individual's personal income as
defined under Haig-Simons. The income VAT, therefore, excludes
from the tax base appreciation in financial assets like stocks and
bonds. 287 As a result, this reliance on an indirect tax, even an
separate basis in the assets. See generally I.R.C § § 301, 302, 311.
283
See, e.g. Martin A. Sullivan, Keeping Score on Class Warfare: Joint Committee on
Taxation and Treasury are Miles Apart, 84 TAX NOTES 963, 963-65 (1999) (describing how
preferential capital gains rates are viewed as tax favors to the wealthy).
,.. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
286
See ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32 .
... ld.
287
See p.S. DEP'TOFTREASURY, supra note 237,5-7.
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income tax collected solely at the business level, may be subject to
the charge from the proponents of the current income tax system
that it fails to fully include income from capital. In particular, an
income tax collected at the business level does not include
appreciation of capital in the tax base even if realized, such as,
realized gain on stock market transactions.
This exclusion for the appreciation in financial assets
represents a conceptual difference between income tax based or
national accounting and the personal income tax. Indeed, it is one
of the significant disputes that Hall and Rabushka have with the
current income tax system. 288 Like the personal income tax,
however, the VAT does not allow a deduction to the purchaser for
the cost of a financial asset. 289
A direct consumption tax such as the cash flow consumed
income tax handles appreciation in financial assets in a slightly
different manner. It imposes a tax on the gain on financial assets,
but only when consumed. It does, however allow a deduction for
the cost of purchasing the assets and, therefore, excludes the
purchase price from the tax base.
These two approaches are the same on a present value basis
under certain simplifying assumptions. In both cases, the tax base
consists of wages and business profits. 290 While these two forms of
consumption tax may be largely equivalent at the aggregate level,
they may not be so at the individual level. 291 The tax burdens on
particular individuals will be dependent upon the taxpayers' tastes
for, and good fortune with respect to, financial assets. 292
Adoption of an income VAT would resolve some of the
preferential treatment of capital by causing the incidence of the tax
to fall in part on capital. 293 Under an income VAT, income is taxed
at the business level, and there is no allowable deduction for
return to capital in the form of either interest or dividends or for

288
289
290

29

'

292

293

HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 117.
See U.S. DEp'T OF TREASURY, supra note 237,5-7.
See Schenk, Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 237.
I d. at 224.
Id. at255.
See U.S. DEFT OF TREASURY, supra note 237,5-7.
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capital expenditures. 294 This treatment is in contrast to the
deduction that would be allowed for capital expenditures under a
subtraction style consumption VAT. 295 Investment and, therefore,
savings would be subjected to this additional tax. 296
One would suspect that the taxation of returns to capital
would be reflected in the amount capital users would be willing to
pay for that capital. Thus, interest and dividend rates would
reflect the non-deductibility of payments for the use of capital. 297
To the extent that appreciation of equity or debt ownership goes
untaxed even if realized, there is a justification that these gains at
the personal level represent merely an anticipation of future
earnings at the business level that have not yet occurred and,
therefore, do not actually represent income from a macroeconomic
perspective. 298 In addition, to the extent that the owner of
appreciated assets sells those assets to a purchaser, the purchaser
does not get a deduction or amortizable basis for the purchase
price, 299 so none of the purchase price can be used to produce an
immediate tax-reducing benefit. 300 This aspect of taxation under
the current system oftentimes represents a double taxation of
income from capital or at least an acceleration of the taxation on
that income. As discussed above301 with regard to income that is
earned by a C corporation or from the sale of stock of such a
corporation,302 the incidence of such a tax resulting purely from
operating in the corporate form is uncertain.
It should be noted, however, that even under the current
income tax structure, not all capital gains are taxed. In order to be
'"' See id.
See id .
... See id.
2111
Taxation on return to capital may be viewed as an additional "expense" of doing
business, and thus would be reflected in the market price. See RoSEN, supra note 52, at
446-48.
208
See ABEL&BERNANKE, supra note 52, at 31-32 9(income defined from a macroeconomic
perspective).
211
See U.S. DEp'TOFTREAsURY, supra note 237,6-7.
100
ld.
101
See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. See also SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra
note 4, at 66-67.
102
·
There is no corporate tax counterpart to a § 754 election and resultant basis
adjustments under§§ 734(b) and 743(b) to offset future income at the entity level.
216
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subjected to tax, the gain must be realized, requiring a sale or
other taxable disposition of the asset. 303 A mere appreciation in
value or exchange in a non-taxable transaction does not trigger the
tax. Moreover, under current law, when the owner of appreciated
. property dies, a beneficiary who receives the property is entitled to
a date of death stepped-up basis in t~e property. 304 In that
manner, the appreciation in the property owned by a decedent at
his death completely escapes income taxation under the current
law. 305 Finally, capital gains, interest, and dividends realized in a
qualified retirement account, including a Section 401(k) plan,
Keogh plan, and individual retirement account (IRA), are not
subject to tax until actually paid to the beneficiary. 306

VII. PROPOSAL: ELECTRONIC POINT-OF-SALE TAXATION
A

Point-of-Sale Taxation: In General

This article advocates point-of-sale taxation because
technological developments in electronic transfers will make such
taxation inexpensive and largely leakproof. To this end, the article
proposes that the current system of income tax be replaced by a
single rate credit type VAT. A single rate retail sales tax
represents a second choice. Such a tax system would not be
personalized. As such, burden sharing modifications, if desirable,
would be made on the expenditure side or by offsetting other taxes
such as social security taxes.

B. Method of Collection
A VAT, as well as a retail sales tax, can be inexpensive,
accurate and virtually leak-proof in an economy in which money
transfers take place electronically. To illustrate this point, assume
a retail purchase transaction using a debit card under a retail sales
See I.R.C. § 1001(b).
..,. See I.R.C. § 1014.
100
ld. (appreciation in assets at death go untaxed due to the stepped up basis the
beneficiary receives in those assets).
303

""" See I.R.C. § 408 (e)(l).
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tax. When the customer' s debit card is swept, the retail merchant
in effect gains access to the customer's bank account. The
appropriate amount, including sales tax, is automatically
withdrawn from the customer's account. The clearing bank which
handles the transaction electronically would then make an
automatic entry, debiting the customer's account for the purchase
price plus the sales tax, crediting the merchant's account for the
purchase price, and crediting the government's tax collection
account for the sales tax. . All of these operations would be
programmed and be part of the clearing bank's normal operations.
A credit card transaction would operate in much the same way
from the consumer's and the merchant's point of view. The only
difference would be that the clearing batik would charge the
customer's credit account for that amount, thereby establishing a
lending transaction, rather than make an immediate withdrawal
from the customer's account. The customer's account would be
charged with both the purchase price and the appropriate sales
tax. As in the debit transaction, the sales tax would be
immediately credited to the federal government's tax collection
account. In that manner, the tax collection would be automatic.
A credit type VAT would operate in much the same manner.
The consumer would observe no difference from a sales tax. The
seller, however, would be entitled to a credit on the VAT previously
paid. Records of the seller's allowable credit would have been kept
by virtue of the financial institution's reporting of the VAT paid on
the seller's initial purchase.
A numerical example will illustrate the mechanics of the tax
collection. A retail purchase made by credit card would
automatically include the sales tax, say 20%. When the credit or
debit card is used for the purchase, an amount equal to 120% of the
original purchase price of the item can be subtracted from the debit
cardholder's account or charged to the credit cardholder's account.
At that time, the 20% portion of the charge can be credited
immediately to a tax collection account of the government at the
financial institution conducting the electronic bookkeeping. In the
case of a VAT, the charge would be bookmarked to identify the
purchaser for later credit. The account can be swept ·either
immediately or at the end of each day to a federal reserve account.
The procedure would.be exactly the same, regardless of whether a
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debit card or a credit card was used. In both cases, the tax
assessed at the point-of-sale would be immediately charged to the
purch~ser and credited to the government's account.
The essential difference between a VAT and a retail sales tax
in terms of mechanics of collection is that under a retail sales tax,
the automatic payment method described above would be the end
ofthe process. In contrast, under a VAT, the seller would have to
be given credit separately for the VAT it paid to its suppliers of
raw materials. As illustrated above, the credit process would
involve an additional step to complete the tax collection process.
But, as discussed earlier, it would reduce the risks of evasion
because the failure to collect the tax at the point of the retail sale
would result in forfeiture of the credit and therefore involve a
smaller loss of revenue than would be the loss under a retail sales
tax. 307 It would also avoid the evasion of tax that could result from
a buyer mischaracterizing a purchase as a business purchase, upon
which no sales tax is due, instead of as a consumption purchase.
Under a VAT, the purchaser would be required to make that
mischaracterization to the government in claiming its credit,
thereby making the claim easier for the government to review and
verify.
It is anticipated that most retail transactions would be
undertaken with either a credit card or a debit card. In some
cases, however, the customer may desire a more de-personalized
method of payment. For example, a taxpayer may desire
confidentiality with regard to her purchases. This confidentiality
can be achieved by allowing the customer to purchase a Stored
Value Card. Furthermore, to prevent the substitution of these
Stored Value Cards for currency, which.could be used to avoid the
sales tax, the holder's personal identification attribute, 308 such as,
currently a PIN and later a thumb print or retinal image, would be
required to transfer funds from the unnamed account accessed by
the card.

See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
Currently, a personal identification number (PIN) is used. However, one can imagine
that a thumb print or retinal image may be substituted as soon as technology allows. See,
e.g. Sifers, supra note 9, at 714, 724-25 (describing security measures for smart cards).
301

108
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In addition, cash cards could be used for small incidental
purchases, such as to satisfy a parking meter. Cash cards would
be printed with magnetic strips like Washington Metro fare
cards. 309 They would be subject to a sales tax when purchased.
For example, assuming a sales tax of 20%, the customer could
purchase a $100 bearer cash card by having $120 debited to the
customer's account. The customer would only have the actual
c
amount of the purchase subtracted from the balance on the card.
Correspondingly, the merchant would keep the entire proceeds of
the sale, because the government had already received its sales tax
when the customer purchased the cash card.
The key to enjoying the speed and convenience of stored value
and cash cards without facilitating the easy avoidance of tax is to
ensure that the cards themselves cannot become a medium of
exchange. This can be accomplished by personalizing the cards to
make them usable by only the purchaser and by preventing
transfer of the value embedded in the card to another card.
This system is also adaptable to an econon;ty in which some
transactions still take place using cash. In those transactions, the
merchant would be required to record the transaction in the same
manner as a debit or credit card transaction, but would direct the
p9:yment of tax electronically from its own funds. The merchant
would have already collected from the customer a sufficient
amount of cash to pay the tax. This payment of tax could occur
automatically by the merchant electronically reporting the sale as
a cash transaction.
Tax collection on cash transactions,
accordingly, would be heavily dependent upon compliance by the
merchant. As cash payments are replaced in the economy by
electronic payments, however, compliance issues would decline.
This article advocates a credit style VAT over a retail sales tax
because the VAT collects tax at all stages of production and is
therefore less easily evaded. In other respects, however, a retail
sales tax lends itself to automatic point-of-sale implementation as

For example, in Washington, D.C., metro riders purchase debit fare cards and put a
certain amount of cash on the card. The rider inserts the card upon entry into the station,
and then reinserts the card upon departure. The amount debited is based upon the distance
traveled.
1011
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well as a VAT. Disregarding this one point, arguments made in
favor of a VAT should apply equally to a retail sales tax.

C. Estimated Cost of System
The cost of a credit card transaction now ranges, generally,
between 2 and 3 percent of the amount of the transaction,
depending upon the value of the transaction and the type of
business. 310 Two percent of the $750 billion revenue collected311
equals $15 billion. To this amount should be added the costs of
ensuring compliance and auditing the application ofVAT credits.
If the full staff of the Service were employed performing these
functions, a rather unlikely prospect, the additional cost would not
exceed $5 billion. 312 The aggregate cost of $20 billion represents
approximately 2.67% of the revenue collected.
This cost, a dead-weight loss to be sure, compares very
favorably to the cost of revenue raising under the current income
tax system of10 percent as estimated by Slemrod, 313 based upon an
overall cost of$75 billion, and extremely favorably to a cost of30%,
based upon Payne's analysis of the ADL data. 314 Moreover, as
electronic funds transfer technology develops, the cost of this
system is likely to decline. Thus, it is likely that the proposal will
reduce revenue collection costs substantially, principally by
eliminating much of the taxpayer compliance and tax planning
costs incurred under the current tax system.

D. Possible Modification of Point-of-Sale Taxation
to Personalize Some Aspects of the Tax
If some personalizing of the tax were desired, however, the
single rate credit style VAT or retail sales tax could be coupled

See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 56.
This amount is based upon Slem.rod's assertion that his estimate of $75 billion for
administration costs equals approximately 10% of the revenue collected. See Slemrod,
Which is the Simplest Tax System, supra note 149, at 368.
'" See id. at 64 (I.R.S. budget devoted to income tax is $5 billion).
•,. See id. at 368; see also supra, notes 149-77 and accompanying text. This is based upon
an overall cost of $75 billion.
314
See supra, notes 149-77 and accompanying text.
110
111
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with shifting of the legal incidence of the portion of the tax on
personal services to workers. This point can best be illustrated by
assuming a credit type VAT system with the exception that wages.
are subject to the VAT. A business paying wages would be entitled
to a credit for the VAT on those wages against the VAT collected
upon sale of its products. No separate withholding, however,
would have to be made with regard to wages. Instead, only an
accounting of previously credited taxes paid as a VAT by the
business would be required. The taxes paid by the business firm
would become the taxes paid on behalf of the employee and would
be credited to the employee's account.
The employee would compute a tax on her wage income at a
flat rate, for which the VAT collected from her employer would be
available as a refundable credit against any wage income tax
liability. In concept, the VAT collected with regard to wages would
serve as tax withheld on her wage income. Under a system of
electronic payments, the VAT amount with respect to wages would
be credited, automatically and electronically, to a tax payment
from the employee on wages through a withholding account for the
individual employee. As a result, when the employee reports her
income, she will also report the VAT credited to her account by the
business firm that paid the compensation. If the VAT rate charged
to the employer and the income tax rate assessed on the employee
were the same, no additional payments would be required. If the
VAT charged to the employer exceeded the employees wage income
tax liability, the employee would be entitled to a refund, and if the
wage income tax liability exceeded the VAT, additional tax would
be due from the employee.
For example, assume a VAT or retail sales tax of 20%. If the
company that has collected the tax pays wages in the amount of
$100, that $100 wage income could be made taxable to the
employee. The employee, however, would be entitled to a
refundable credit equal to the VAT or sales tax that had been paid
by the employer with regard to the employee's wages.
Conceptually, this amount can be viewed as the amount collected
by the employer from its customer with respect to that $100. That
amount, $20, represents the VAT on the portion of the employer's
sale price attributable to the employee's wage. Thus, if the
employee's income from personal services was less than the
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applicable low income allowance or zero tax amount, no additional
tax would be due and, depending upon the rate structure, some of
the tax credit could be refunded to the employee. On the other
hand, if the employee's wage income was high and the applicable
tax rate on such income exceeded 20%, the employee would still
have additional tax liability after taking into account the $20
credit. (It should be noted that the wage earner's tax could be
computed with or without a gross-up of the $20; the choice would
simply reflect the desired effective rate of the tax on the employee.)
In this manner, by engrafting a wage tax onto the VAT or sales
tax, the tax system could be personalized for wage earners even
though substantially all of the tax due would have been collected
at the point-of-sale by means of a VAT or sales tax.
This system could be implemented in a slightly different way.
The wage earner's tax could be enacted as an income tax on wages
subject to employer withholding. The employer, in turn, could be
allowed a VAT credit for wage taxes withheld. This system would
function mechanically, however, in the same manner for the
employer as the payment of a VAT on wages. The wage
withholding on the personal services income of an employee would
generate a credit to the employer company, but a like amount
would be subtracted from the employee's wages and automatically
paid to the government. If the employee were then taxed on a base
measured by wages in a manner similar to a personalized income
tax, allowing personal exemptions, a low income allowance, and
graduated rates, then the withholding with respect to the
employee's wages would serve as an offset to her wage income tax.
This amount could be refunded for a low wage employee (figured
as an aggregate of all of the employee's wages for the year). A high
wage employee would have to pay additional tax if his tax liability
exceeded the withheld amount.
Both conceptualizations described above are economically
equivalent. They differ only in the technical description and legal
incidence of the tax on wage earnings. In the first system, the
legal incidence of the tax is on the employer, and the tax paid by
the employer is available, computationally, as a refundable credit
to the employee. In the second system, the legal incidence of the
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tax is on the employee, but the tax is satisfied automatically
through withholding by the employer. 315
The alternatives described above differ from the HallRabushk.a flat tax structure in that they employ a credit method
VAT instead of the subtraction type VAT advocated by Hall and
Rabushk.a. Consequently, they facilitate point-of-sale taxation
while still allowing for greater progressivity due to increased
flexibility in the taxation of personal services.
Both the single rate credit type VAT or the VAT coupled with
the collection of personal service tax from the service provider .
would be consistent with the objectives discussed in the article,
because under both systems, collection of and accounting for the
tax would take place solely or substantially at the point of
payment, whether for sale of goods or non-employee compensation
for services. The modification with regard to the personal services
of employees, of course, would personalize the tax somewhat, but
it would also add a corresponding layer of administration and
attendant costs because it could not be achieved automatically.
The trade-off between cost control and personalizing the tax is a
fundamental issue that must be addressed in evaluating taxation
at point-of-sale and is discussed in more detail in Section F of this
part.
As a third alternative employing point-of-sale taxation, an
income tax VAT could be adopted. While not advocated in this
paper, it would nevertheless be much less expensive to administer
.and therefore preferable to the current personal income tax. Both
the income tax VAT and the subtraction type consumption VAT
depend upon annual accounting, in contrast to the credit type VAT,
which is transactional. In addition, a credit type VAT is to some
degree self policing. Each purchaser has an incentive to see that
his immediate seller reports the transaction and pays the VAT in
order that the purchaser can receive credit for the VAT paid.
Principally for these reasons, the income VAT and the subtraction
type VAT are inferior to the credit type VAT in a system that
involves point-of-sale assessment and collection of the tax.

•,. The reader should recognize the equivalence by reference to the previously discussed
gas station hypothetical. See supra, notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
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E. Special Circumstances
The system described above appears simple, straightforward,
secure, and relatively inexpensive to administer for everyday sales
of goods and payment for services. Special circumstances,
however, may require some modifications to the general
procedures.
1. Used Property

Under the VAT proposal, the sale of used property other than
financial assets would be subject to tax. Ordinarily, however,
tangible property such as used automobiles and household
appliances are unlikely to increase in value, so imposing a tax on
the sale of those items would amount to double taxation of the
items since a tax was paid when the items were originally
purchased by the seller. Thus, under a VAT, a credit would be
allowed for tax previously paid on used property that is
subsequently re-sold. The credit, which would be non-refundable,
would usually obviate the need for collecting an additional sales
tax. Under a credit style VAT, the credit would theoretically be
automatic; although, as a practical matter, consumers who sell
used property would be unlikely to have procedures established to
make automatic use of it.
In some circumstances, however, used property appreciates.
An example of appreciating property would be artwork. In that
case, in order to avoid double taxation or cascading of tax, a credit
would be allowed for tax previously paid by the seller, which would
offset some but not all of the VAT due upon the subsequent sale.
Collection of the tax on the sale of used property would not be
as easy as collection from a taxpayer engaged in the business of
retail selling. In the case of the VAT as applied to retail sellers
and intermediate goods producers, electronic transactions would
be the norm, and the mechanism for collecting the tax would be
automatic and inexpensive. In the case of the casual seller, on the
other hand, a payment of any substantial amount would eventually
also be electronic, but the automatic imposition of a sales tax on
the gross amount would not permit the subtraction of the credit.
It may be that record keeping of the credit would be required with
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the justification that casual sales of property are not commonplace
occurrences. Alternatively, the mechanics of the process cart be
solved for certain kinds of property. For example, property such as
automobiles could be subjected to federal tax upon registration in
the same manner that they are currently subjected to state sales
tax.
Finally, the availability ofthe credit may need to be sacrificed
in order to achieve a simpler system. Arguably, in the interests of
simplification, casual resales should not be subjected to tax. The
benefits from simplification would have to be weighed against the
possibility of complete avoidance of the VAT (pre~?umably, however,
only on value added by the immediate seller) by retail sellers who
sell indirectly to customers through intermediaries acting in the
guise of a purchaser and casual seller. Accordingly, the proposal
made in this paper would be implemented best by seeking to tax
resales and allowing a credit for previous tax paid, the records for
which should be available electronically. Alternatively, the extra
burden of cascading (VAT without credit for tax previously paid)
may have to be endured by the casual reseller.

2. Personal Residences
The VAT proposal, similar to the national retail sales tax that
has been proposed by Congressmen Schaefer (R-Colo) and Tauzin
(R-La) (NST Proposal,)316 could impose a tax on the purchaser of a
primary residence, but allow the purchaser to elect to pay the tax
over thirty years, with interest. This treatment is in contrast to
the purchase of other residences used for consumption, under the
NST Proposal, for which sales tax would be due upon purchase, but
which could be financed privately. 317 In the event the election to
"" The National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996 H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996). The NST
proposal is explored in great detail in DAVID R. BURTON & DAN R. MAsTROMARCO,
EMANCIPATING AMERICA FROM THE INCOME TAX- HOW THE NATIONAL SALES TAX WOULD
WORK (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 272, 1997) ("Burton & Mastromarco No. 1"). See
also David R. Burton & Dan R. Mastromarco, The National Sales Tax: Moving Beyond the
Idea, 71 TAX NOTES 1237, 1244 (1996) ("Burton & Mastromarco No. 2"). The authors
provide a specific methodology regarding how the NST would operate in practice. The
discussion contained in this section of the article advocates their suggestion ofhow the NST
would be implemented.
317
BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at 17-18.
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defer payment of the ta.X is made with respect to the primary
residence, the full amount would become due upon resale of the
home. 318 Consistent with an attempt to avoid cascading, a
purchaser of the home should be permitted a credit for the tax
previously paid by the seller. 319 The transaction would be recorded
in county land records, so verification of the allowable credit
should not be difficult. 320
In contrast to the treatment of a first time purchase of a home,
the retail sales tax proposal would allow a present homeowner who
purchases a replacement home to apply the amount of tax
previously paid o~ her first house as a credit against the tax due
on her second house. 321 Consistency would seem to indicate having
the credit run with the house rather than with the homeowner. 322
The-homeowner would, nevertheless, obtain benefit from the credit
because she would be able to sell the house to a subsequent
purchaser who would be relieved of the obligation of paying the tax
up to the amount of the credit. 323 In that way the credit could be
included in the price of the house upon resale. 324
In any event, because of the size of the transaction and its
importance to the participants, as well as the usual participation
of financial intermediaries, the automatic electronic payment of
the applicable tax would not create an additional administrative
burden of any significance. 325

3. Mixed-Use Property
Under a sales tax, great importance is placed on whether the
property purchased will be used in business, in which case it will
Id. at 18.
uo Id.
120
State real property law would continue to apply to real estate transactions .
.., BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at 18-19.
822
As described supra at note 320, the current real property recording system would be
utilized to maintain records fothe credits, similar to other encumbrances on property which
are also recorded in land records. See BURTON & MAsTROMARCO No. 1, supra note 316, at
18-19.
... See id.
824
See id.
326
See BURTON & MAsTROMARCO, No. 2, supra note 316, at 1239.
318
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not be subject to the retail sales tax, or whether it will be used for
personal consumption, in which case it will be subject to the retail
sales tax. 326 A similar issue arises with regard to the purchase of
services. The NST proposal suggests a rule of thumb for mixed-use
property, requiring that it be used more than 95% for exempt
purposes before an exemption is allowed. 327
The issue is substantially less important under a VAT because
the tax is paid at each stage of production. Therefore, no
exemption from the tax should be available at any stage.

4. Barter Transactions and the Underground Economy
Barter transactions and the underground economy have been
significant problems under the current income tax system. 328
Barter takes place without any cash being transferred and,
therefore, readily avoids detection by the revenue authorities. It
is particularly troublesome with respect to services because the
entire value of the property or services received in exchange for
other services, which would ordinarily be included in income, can
escape taxation. Similarly, transactions in the underground
economy escape taxation because cash is used and, therefore,
readily avoids detection.
Similar problems arise and must be dealt with under the
proposal to tax transactions at the point-of-sale. The magnitude
of the problem, however, is likely to be less, both with respect to
barter and the underground economy, particularly under a credit
type VAT. First, one would expect that the tax rate imposed on a
point-of-sale transaction would be lower than the tax rate imposed
under the current income tax. As such, the amount of revenue lost
to evasion would be smaller as well.
Second, the loss of revenue is most serious when both sides of
the barter transactions are ultimately used for consumption. To
the extent that one side of the barter transaction is in the

... Id. at 1246.
.... ld.
328
See Burgess J. W. Raby & William L. Raby, Barter Transactions and the Tax Collector,
77 TAX NOTES, 949 (1997).
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production process, the purchaser of that side will not be entitled
to a credit for any value-added tax, so the tax-free acquisition of
services will ultimately be taxed upon resale of the finished
product. While a similar situation occurs under the income tax in
that the business taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for
bartered services, taxpayers may, in effect, obtain a deduction to
the extent of their basis in the transferred property, particularly
if the transferred property is reflected as goods sold since it is no
longer in inventory. Further, under the income tax, there is no
assurance that both sides of the barter transaction will be reported
consistently, that is, there is no assurance that the failure to report
a receipt in income will be offset by the inability of the other side
to report a deduction. In contrast, under a VAT, the failure to
report the transaction entirely would automatically affect both
sides of the exchange in a consistent manner.
Third, to the extent barter transactions require policing, there
will be greater availability of resources to do the policing under
point-of-sale taxation because of the significant savings from other
aspects of the revenue system. 329 Unreported income is currently,
and is likely to continue to be, a problem under the income tax
system· as long as it exists.
Fourth, and most importantly, the replacement of currency
transactions with electronic transactions will significantly reduce
the loss of tax revenues from the underground economy. To the
extent that substantial amounts of money pass, the money must be
transferred electronically and tax will be assessed automatically.
The remaining loss of revenue should be minor compared with the
current income tax system. Although the problem will continue to
exist for point-of-sale taxation barter transactions, the importance
of these transactions, particularly for taxpayers who purchase for
resale at retail, will not be very important. Even under the current
income tax system, cash transactions represent a much greater
share of the tax avoidance economy than pure barter transactions.

Since the cost of administering the point-of-sale taxation would be significantly less
than the current tax system, see supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text, resources
would be freed up to address the issue of policing barter transactions.
120

HeinOnline -- 20 Va. Tax Rev. 60 2000-2001

2000]

The Transition to a Currency-Free Economy

61

A caveat, however, is in order here. To the extent that there
is an expansion of the use of true "e-money", 330 the accountability
for the government of transactions that use "e-money" may become
doubtful. 331 Keeping track of these transactions in a manner
sufficient to ensure proper collection of a point-of-sale tax would
become correspondingly more troublesome. This situation would
mirror the difficulties that the central bank money regulators
would likely encounter if they sought to monitor the money supply
and protect users of "e-money", as well as others affected by it,
from potential financial melt-down in the event of a the failure of
one or more issuers. 332
On the other hand, at least for transactions that are not
illegal, presumably major issuers of "e-money" will be generally
known. 333
Otherwise the "e-money" would not be widely
334
accepted. Thus, the taxing authorities should be able to identify
issuers of "e-money" and force compliance, at least from domestic
issuers.
It is difficult to deal with and resolve potential tax issues
involving "e-money" at this point, however, because "e-money" is
currently more hypothetical than real. As a result, it is extremely
difficult to foresee with any precision how regulators will make
issuers of"e-money" accountable. Once that becomes clearer, there
likely will be a means to ensure that "e-money" transactions will
be traceable by taxing authorities.

5. Gifts
Cash gifts would also have to be made electronically. If gifts
were excluded from the transaction tax base, then they would have
That is, third party promises in the form of internet accounts whose balances have no
counterpart in any deposits at a fmancial institution. See supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text.
331
True e-money could be developed to protect the anonymity of its owner and not be
traceable. This anonymous e-money would also make the owner's identity unavailable for
the purposes of attaching tax liability. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
032
See supra notes 330-31. If a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve Bank, would
be unable to trace the path of e-money, then it follows that tax collection would experience
the same difficulties utilizing similar technology.
333
See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 74-75 .
... ld.
030
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to be specially identified at the time of the transfer in order to
avoid the automatic assessment. Unlike gifts currently, there
would be a trail because of the required identification of the
transfer as a gift. That would facilitate wealth transfer taxation,
if the amounts are large, and audit, in the event that the
government desired verification.

6. Transitional Considerations
There are many transitional issues in replacing the current
income tax with consumption tax as the exclusive means of raising
revenue. That is the case regardless of whether the consumption
tax takes the form of a sales tax, VAT, Hall-Rabushka flat tax, or
a cash flow consumed income tax. The automatic and electronic
collection of a tax imposed at the time of the transaction should not
add to the burdens of transition once the technology has been fully
developed and, for most sizeable transactions, would require little
more than the modification of software.
F. PERSONALIZING THE TAX

Personalizing the tax involves tailoring a taxpayer's tax
liability on the basis of particular attributes of the taxpayer in
order to achieve fairness, however that term is defined. 335 If
fairness requires that taxation be based upon ability to pay, then
taking personal attributes of a taxpayer into account in assessing
the tax ensures that distributional fairness can be achieved. The
attributes that may be considered include marital status, number
of dependants, hardships, such as medical expenses, and the
amount of expenditures made in a tax-favored way, such as
charitable contributions. Personalizing can also take into account
some measure of the taxpayer's "ability to pay," based upon the

... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 4 7-83 for a general discussion of the different
theoretical conceptions of fairness. Fairness in the personal income tax generally refers to
taxation in accordance with ability to pay. Moreover, fairness requires horizontal equity,
under which two people with equivalent incomes, after subtracting costs for producing that
!ncome, should pay equivalent taxes. I d. at 52.
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aggregate amount of the taxpayer's income, wealth, or
consumption.

1. _Choosing the Legal Incidence of the Tax
Imposing the legal incidence of the tax on the individual
taxpayer facilitates the ability to personalize the tax so that it
takes account of the personal circumstances of the taxpayer. The
personal income tax, for example, takes account of the income
recipient's marital status, number of children and other
dependents, amount of current or potential consumption that the
income recipient chooses to forego by giving money to charity, and
homeowner status, for which the income recipient may be indebted
and paying home mortgage interest. The current income tax
system, which takes into account all of these personal attributes
and many more in order to achieve fairness, requires that the legal
incidence of the tax be placed on the income recipient. 336
On the other hand, the personalizing of the income tax also
adds substantial complexity to the revenue raising system and,
therefore, to the inefficiency and dead-weight loss. If one viewed
the ability to personalize the tax as more of a weakness than a
strength of a tax system, then a tax on transactions such as a
consumption tax in the form of a retail sales tax or value added tax
could almost entirely avoid the temptation to personalize the tax.
A tax that imposes the legal incidence on the income recipient,
such as the Hall-Rabushka flat tax or the cash flow consumed
income tax, would retain the flexibility, and, therefore, the
temptation, to personalize the tax.
Importantly, all attempts to personalize a tax will make it
more difficult to collect the tax in a direct manner at the point-ofsale. That is because the personalization of the tax, even if
collected automatically at the point-of-sale, will require either an
application for refund with supporting information, or a tax return
accompanied by additional payment of the tax, and by appropriate
evidence of the liability. Personalizing a tax, therefore, will involve
administrative costs payable both at the government level and the

*

See I.R.C. § 1
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income recipient level. It is possible that the dead-weight loss
resulting from those costs will outweigh the fairness benefits of
personalizing the tax. That would be particularly true when many
of the desired aspects of the personalization can be done by means
of direct grants from the government. For example, instead of
personalizing the personal income tax by allowing a deduction for
charitable contributions, the subsidy to charities can be
accomplished through matching grants.
Because of these administrative costs, the cash flow
consumption tax is not readily susceptible to the proposal made in
this paper and the benefits attendant to that proposal. In addition,
like the current income tax, the cash flow consumption tax is
susceptible to micro management and the inefficiencies and
complexities resulting from that micromanagement. 337 It requires
individuals to go through the annual ritual of completing a tax
return and tracking receipts and expenditures. While the cash
flow consumption tax changes the base from the current income
tax system, and creates some simplification by virtue of being a
consumption rather ·than an income tax, it is not readily
susceptible to point-of-sale taxation.
In contrast to the cash flow consumed income model, a VAT
coupled with the Hall-Rabushka flat style tax on wage income
entails less personalizing. It, therefore, is more readily susceptible
to mechanical implementation. The tax can be assessed and
collected largely at the point of transaction, particularly if the VAT
credit to the selling firm can be subtracted electronically and
automatically. Under the flat tax part of the plan, however,
personalizing can take place as a part of the tax on employees'
wages.

The term "micromanagement" is generally used to refer to the situation where every
little detail of what one does is essentially supervised by someone else in a painstaking
intrusive and nonproductive manner. The current income tax system as well as the cash
flow consumption tax involves a great deal ofmicromanagement by the government under
the guise of "targeted tax incentives," a phrase used repeatedly, if not coined, by the
Administration of President Clinton. See Heidi Glenn, Clinton May Offer Job-Creating and
Homeowner Tax Incentives, 72 TAX NOTES 1103 (1996).
331
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2. Progressivity in General
The most important impediment to replacing the income tax
involves the ability to personalize the income tax, and the most
important aspect of personalizing the tax involves the issue of
progressive taxation. 338 Proponents of the income tax as well as
some forms of consumption tax consider this aspect of tax policy a
precondition of fundamental tax reform and a necessary part of
any replacement tax system. 339 Their arguments in favor of
progressivity fall into four categories.
First, taxation should be based upon "ability to pay." 340
Higher income taxpayers have disproportionately greater
discretionary income out of which they can pay tax, and are
therefore better able to bear a disproportionately greater tax. 341
Second, payments should be required in accordance with the
benefits received by the taxpayer. 342 Higher income taxpayers
derive greater benefits from our economy and society, which
facilitate the higher earning. 343
Third, taxation should require "equality of sacrifice. "344
Proponents of progressive rates on this basis generally ground
their position on the assertion that an extra dollar of accumulation
is worth less to a rich person than a poor person. 345 Accordingly,
in order to achieve equal sacrifice, one must tax high income

108
For a general discussion of the arguments dealing with progressivity, see Walter J.
Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv.
417 (1952). See also Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
60 TAXES 16 (1982); Boris I. Bittk.er, Second Lecture in Debate with Charles 0. Galvin, in
TAXPOUCY: READINGS AND MATERIALS 123 (Philip D. Oliver & Fred W. Peel, Jr. eds. 1996).
aaa Id. See also MORRIS, supra note 132, at 173; GILLIS ET AL., supra note 214 at 735; Anne
L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: a
Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAXLAW REV. 363, 368 (1996)(arguing that the current
consumption tax theorists are hiding the lack ofprogressivity in their proposals). See also
generally MCMAHON & ABREU, supra note 128; BANKMAN & GRIFFITH, supra note 120.
140
See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 64 (1953).
.., See id. at 35-39.
142
See id.
... See id. at 64 .
... See id. at 39-45, 70-71.
... See id. at 40.
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taxpayers at a disproportionately higher rate than lower income
taxpayers. 346
Fourth, a system of taxation should reduce inequality of
wealth. 347 Progression accomplishes this objective. 348 If one
accepts the proposition that income and wealth distribution should
be more equal than what would occur in a free market, then the
issue becomes how best to accomplish the redistribution. A free
market, without a means of redistribution of its rewards, would
generate economic inequality. 349 This inequality can be corrected
more efficiently through the tax system by means of progressive
rates than by intervention in the goods and services markets. 350 To
be sure, some efficiency must be sacrificed to achieve more
economic equality through tax policy, but a trade-off of this type
may be acceptable in order to achieve the important objective of
reducing economic inequality.
The arguments for progressivity can all be viewed as different
aspects of an argument based upon the notion of fairness. 351
Therefore, if a principal goal of the tax system is to collect revenue
in a fair and equitable manner, the argument goes, progressivity
should be an essential part of that revenue raising system. 352 As
a result, the argument follows, no system of taxation, whatever its
merits, should be adopted to replace the income tax unless it can
be made progressive and thereby allow for the collection of taxes
disproportionately from taxpayers in accordance with their
aggregate amount of income,353 even if the tax base is consumption.
Under this view, consumption taxes are inherently regressive
when evaluated using the standard of income. 354 That is, a
consumption tax will tax a smaller proportion of a taxpayer's

... Seeid.
7
..
See id. at 55, 70-80 (1953).
... See id. at 71.
... See id. at 80-81.
... See id. at 84.
101
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 83.
102
See BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 104.
... See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 1016
(1992); AsToTr, supra note 339, at 364-66; BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 104.
... ld.
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income than even a proportionate income tax would. 355 This
position is based on the legal incidence of the consumption tax. 356
The economic incidence is much more uncertain. Further, it is
tempered by the possibility of a steeply graduated consumption
tax. If even a graduated consumption tax would be unacceptably
regressive, a flat rate consumption tax such as a single rate VAT
would be even more objectionable. 357
Advocates of a flat rate tax system, whether based on income
or consumption, argue that fairness is achieved through a single
flat rate, although most would concede that at a low level of income
or consumption, no tax should be collected at all. 358 Thus, a single
rate system with a zero bracket amount achieves that fairness. 359
Moreover, some flat rate tax advocates urge that a system that
incorporates a zero bracket amount and generous standard
deductions is progressive on the basis of average tax rates,
although the marginal tax rate for all taxpayers subject to any rate
of tax is the same. 360
Advocates of a flat rate system further argue against
progressivity on the basis of the negative consequences attendant
to a steeply graduated system. 361 They argue that graduation
depresses savings and investment, resulting in a smaller
accumulation of capital and slower growth than would otherwise
occur. 362
Graduated rates, it is further argued, stifle
entrepreneurial risk because gains are taxed at a high bracket,
whereas losses offset other income taxed in a lower bracket. 363 In

... See BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 94-95.
0156
Id. at 96-99; RoSEN, supra note 52, at 362 .
.., See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 232 (concluding that the VAT shifts more of
the tax burden onto the working poor). A single rate VAT would be inherently regressive
because the amount of the tax paid is not related to ability to pay. See supra notes 224-44
and accompanying text, describing the implementation of a VAT.
0156
See HALL&RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 26; MOORE, supra note 218, at 117; SCHENK,
Value Added Tax, supra note 225, at 240.
... Id.
'"" See RoBERT E. HALLET. AL.,FAIRNESSANDEmCIENCYINTHEFLATTAX28-29 (1996);
BLUM & KALVEN, JR., supra note 340, at 90-94.
381
382

383

See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 4, at 24.
See BLUM& KALVEN,JR., supra note 340 at 36 -37; Federico, supra note 132, at 362-65.
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 116.
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addition, high rates of tax create disincentives to work, causing
taxpayers to trade work for more leisure. 364 To the extent that
rates are graduated, the highest marginal rate of tax would be
higher than a tax system containing uniform rates. 365 The
disincentive towards work would be most noticeable and egregious
in the case of married couples. 366 Other arguments are also made
against progression, including its connection to high rates of tax,
resulting in the inability of individuals to accumulate wealth and
avoid the feeling of stagnation, and the effect of high rates on an
increase in the incentives for cheating. 367
No attempt can be made here to resolve the debate over
progressivity. That is particularly the case because the arguments
focus on the legal incidence of tax instead of the economic
incidence, which is far more important but also far more difficult
to determine. However, certain observations can be made that will
be helpful in understanding the real trade-off involved in accepting
progressivity as an essential part of the tax system. First, it is not
necessary that all parts of the system of government taxation and
spending, which involves both taxation and government transfer
payments, be progressive. If one wanted to achieve a more equal
society, one could accomplish that through a flat rate tax system
with direct government expenditures disproportionately spent to
benefit the less well off. This is the method employed in the Social
Security system. The Social Security tax is essentially flat, but the
retirement and insurance benefits to participants in the system go
disproportionately to lower income participants. Eliminating the
Social Security tax for lower wage employees would also achieve a
greater degree of overall progressivity. 368
Second, the desirability of reducing income inequality through
the tax system must be weighed against the benefits to be achieved
... See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
... See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 180.
,.. See, e.g. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX, supra note 4, at 29-40 (discussing the
"marriage penalty" where a married couple is taxed on their aggregate income at a higher
marginal rate than two single people.)
187
See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 143-52.
... Eliminating the Social Security tax for low wage employees would integrate the income
tax and the Social Security tax and thereby increase the redistributional effects of the
combined income tax and Social Security tax systems.
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by reducing costs of the tax collection system. This weighing must
also take into account the possibility of achieving reduced
inequality by some other means. Most of the debate over
progressivity has taken place in the context of an income tax, so
administrative cost savings attendant to adopting a flat rate
system have been regarded as relatively minor when compared
with the goals advocates of progression desire to achieve. 369 When
one expands the possibilities of revenue raising systems to include
a system that is substantially less expensive to administer if
operated using a flat rate of tax, then the arguments for and
against progressivity must be re-evaluated in that broader context.
Third, advocates of a progressive tax view the income tax as
the best method of taxation to achieve progressivity and, therefore,
fairness. 370 Nonetheless, on close examination of the current
structure of the income tax, it should be observed that there is a
distinct lack of progressivity at the higher end of income, when
measured against the Haig-Simons definition of personal
income. 371 That is because the current income tax system fails to
tax income in the form of unrealized appreciation, a benefit likely
to be enjoyed most by the well off. This benefit, although generally
in the nature of deferral, entails complete forgiveness of tax on
gain in the case of a taxpayer who dies with the appreciated
property. 372 In addition, the current structure of the income tax
does not tax imputed income from property, services, or leisure.
Finally, it fails to tax currently all income accruing in a qualified
retirement account, whether in the form of interest, dividends, or
capital gain, allowing deferral until the amounts are paid out to
the beneficiary. These departures from a Haig-Simons income tax
structure are likely to be unavoidable under any income tax that
could be employed. It is not likely that any income tax system that
is reasonably administrable could tax imputed income or
. unrealized gain. In addition, it is unlikely that Congress in the

..., See supra notes 338-55 and accompanying text.
See, e.g. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 233; GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX, supra
note 4, at 275; Alstott, supra note 339, at 367-68.
171
See ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 1115 (no tax on appreciation until realization).
372
See I.R.C. § 1014 (a).
170
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foreseeable future will have the desire to tax qualified retirement
savings as they accrue.

3. Progressivity and Point-of-Sale Taxation
To the extent that progressivity is desirable, there are several
altematives available to accomplish some degree of progressivity
under single rate point-of-sale taxation. Progressivity could be
accomplished through a VAT system by shifting the legal incidence
of the tax on personal service income to the service provider. As
described earlier, a VAT could be charged on amounts paid for the
services of employees, which would in tum generate a VAT credit
to the employer purchasing the services. 373 At the employee level,
low wage earners could receive a refund of a portion of the VAT
paid. Thus, the personalizing features could be applied at the
individual wage earner level.
To the extent the taxes are personalized, however,
computation and payment would become mechanically more
cumbersome, requiring reconciliation between the amounts paid
automatically and the actual amount of tax due. The reconciliation
. of these amounts may also have to take into account the gross-up
resulting from the inclusion in the employee's income of the
automatically paid tax for purposes of determining the employee's
tax liability. Personalized taxes would diverge from the model of
automatic and electronic tax computation and collection, thereby
adding expense to the tax system. If modification of a pure pointof-sale tax were desired, the system at least has semi-automatic
aspects.
This trade-off, however, should be given careful
consideration before being accepted.
This system lends itself to electronic payments. At the
individual level, a system of direct deposit for wages would
facilitate the electronic crediting to the low wage employee for the
VAT paid by the business with respect to the wages. The VAT
refund to the employee with respect to personal service income
could be based on a low income amount. An employee's wages from

.,. See supra, notes 232-44 and accompanying text.
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all employers would have to be aggregated for these purposes. This
system would be similar to that advocated by Hall and Rabushk.a.
Even with this modification, however, proponents of
progressivity may argue that automatic taxation at the point-ofsale is regressive because it only taxes consumption, not savings,
and is not progressive at high income levels. In addition, they
would argue, automatic point-of-sale taxation, whether
administered as a retail sales tax or a VAT, is the most regressive
consumption tax because it imposes a flat rate of tax on all sales.
As has been noted previously, point-of-sale taxation can also
be achieved under an income VAT. 374 Thus, whether point-of-sale
taxation is regressive depends more upon the tax base used than
upon the method of collection. However, it is unclear that a
consumption tax is more regressive than an income tax when
measured by the economic incidence of the tax.
In addition, the retail sales tax and VAT can employ multiple
rates of tax. At the extreme they can impose a low tax on food and
clothing or exclude such purchases from the base entirely.
However, even under an electronic system, such a modification
would increase compliance costs and loss of revenue through
cheating by mislabeling the goods sold as no tax or low tax goods.
Consequently, as demonstrated by the European experience, a
multiple rate system should be avoided.
Finally, a degree ofprogressivity could be worked into a sales
tax or VAT in three other ways, all involving government
expenditures, without disturbing the point-of-sale collection
systems or the single rate of tax. First, the government, which can
keep track electronically of aggregate tax collections from each
individual, could refund the tax on the first predetermined amount
of purchases, for example the first $20,000. Second, the
government could simply refund a flat amount to all taxpayers
equal to the VAT on that $20,000 of purchases. Third, the
government could refund an amount equal to the sales tax rate
times the poverty level through a "family consumption refund"

174

See supra Part VI. B.
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established for each household. 375 The exact amount of the family
consumption refund would depend upon the size of the family. All
of these methods could determine the refunded amount on an
annualized basis. Allowable refunds could be made for households
on a periodic basis by requiring the employer to add an additional
amount to the paycheck of the employee. This amount would offset
the employer's other tax obligations to the government. In the case
of unemployed taxpayers, refunds could be made through direct
government rebates, which could be accomplished by creating
credit balances on a debit card.
It should be noted that a refund based upon a taxpayer's
income would require computation of that income and would
thereby be counterproductive in a system designed to eliminate the
need for such a computation. 376 Such a refund, however, could be
based on the level of a taxpayer's earned income that is subject to
social security tax, which would still be computed by employers
and self employed taxpayers. The point here is that this tax
refund mechanism, which is really a mechanism for government
expenditures, demonstrates that taxes and spending should be
considered together in evaluating wealth redistribution. Indeed,
net of interest on the national debt, transfer payments currently
represent the bulk of government spending. 377 In addition, many
of the recent tax reductions that have been labeled "targeted tax
cuts" are disguised expenditure programs and included as "tax
expenditures" in the government's tax expenditure budget. 378
Detractors of the progressive retail sales tax and VAT might
fear the specter of checks flowing in many directions as a potential
source of significant leakage and waste. When accomplished
electronically, however, the cost of these payments and the

A similar idea is discussed in SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 4, at 220 (creation of
"income maintenance programs to offset the impact of a VAT, or perhaps a new universal
tax credit paid to all individuals and families"). See also GILLIS ET AL., supra note 214, at
736-738, (rebate or refund ofVAT would be paid to qualifying individuals to relieve the tax
burden on the poor).
378
See SCHENK, Value Added Tax, supra note225, at, 270.
371
See Michael Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS OF TAX
REFORM 10, 11, (Michael Boskin ed. 1996).
378
Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform in TAXPOUCY 507, 509(Philip D. Oliver
& Fred W. Peel, eds. 1996) (describing the federal tax expenditure budget).
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opportunities for diversion should be reduced significantly. What
seems infeasible in a paper and currency economy becomes
substantially more feasible in an electronic economy.
Finally, progressivity can be achieved without burdening the
tax collection system with the need to measure income by imposing
the VAT on lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers. This system
would tax wealth transfers, would deal with large accumulations
of wealth, and would introduce long term progressivity.
Alternatively, the current estate and gift tax system could be
adjusted and modified to accomplish this goal more efficiently. 379
On balance, any position that exalts progressivity over all
other objectives of a tax system is somewhat hypocritical, because
true progressivity has not been and is unlikely to be achieved in
the personal income tax. 380 Progressivity itself should not be the
goal. Rather, it should be a means to achieve a distribution of
benefits from society for its members, and, there are alternative
means available to accomplish that ultimate goal.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has advocated point-of-sale taxation as the most
efficient and least costly means of collecting tax in an economy in
which electronic funds transfers, credit and debit card
transactions, and "e-money" will eventually become the standard
method of making purchases and transferring funds. The point-ofsale tax system proposed in this paper would use a consumption
base and would replace the income tax even if some transactions
were still undertaken using cash.
A major objection to the point-of-sale taxation proposal
suggested in this paper will be the presumed inability to
personalize the tax so as to impose the burden, at least in large
part, based upon ability to pay. In short, detractors of a
transactions based tax will argue that the proposed system is
regressive and therefore unacceptable. In theory, either a credit
.,. MichaelJ. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It in TAXPOUCY 465,470-71
(Philip D. Oliver & Fred W. Peel, eds. 1996) (advocating increased use of transfer taxes for
enhanced progressity).
180 See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
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type VAT or a retail sales tax can be coupled with a tax on personal
service income to achieve a compromise, as long as the tax on
personal service income is simple. Coupling the VAT with a tax on
personal service income facilitates personalizing the tax with
special aspects such as progressivity. Point-of-sale taxation,
without the personalizing facilitated by an accompanying tax on
personal service income, however, can accomplish substantially all
of the desirable goals of the present income tax system. Adding an
income tax component could substantially undercut the benefits of
the transaction based tax, depending upon the degree to which the
tax is personalized or used to accomplish other social objectives.
Personalizing involves adopting an additional tax collection
apparatus. It involves substantial cost and deadweight loss.
Adherence to a personalized tax at the cost of this deadweight loss
is an undesirable choice in the face of the uncertainty regarding
the economic incidence of any tax. The non-susceptibility of pointof-sale taxation to personalization is a strength of the system, not
a weakness and argues in favor of its adoption. Wealth
redistribution, if desired, can be accomplished better and more
efficiently in ways other than through individual computation of
tax liability.
Fundamental tax reform is a concept that has a long gestation
period. The U.S. economy is becoming largely based on electronic
payments, and it is time to consider seriously an appropriate tax
system for that form of economy. As e-commerce replaces cash
transactions, point-of-sale taxation, in the manner described in
this paper, should replace the current income tax system.
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